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 1.0 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
1.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
To date, the economic impact of SB 1080 is negligible for two reasons.  First, many people 
currently hold driver’s licenses and ID cards who will not be able to renew them; SB 1080 will 
not be full implemented until 2016.  Second, the state, nation and globe entered a severe 
recession within months of the implementation of SB 1080, which swamps the effects of this 
legislation.  The primary economic effect will be due to a decline in the size of the 
undocumented labor force that will not be really felt by employers until the state economy 
returns to something like full employment conditions.  Economists characterize this recession as 
so severe that recovery will not occur before 2 to 3 years, at a minimum. 
The undocumented workforce is extremely concentrated in particular industries and 
occupations.  Consequently the primary economic impacts will be felt in those economic 
niches where employers currently rely on undocumented labor.  Employers in these areas are 
already reporting that while they are not faced with anything that could be described as a labor 
shortage, they are beginning to experience the loss of key individuals. 
The undocumented population in Oregon is estimated to be 95% of Mexican origin, though 
the undocumented population nationwide is more diverse.  A substantial majority of the 
Mexican-born population is estimated to be undocumented.  Clearly, good statistics do not 
exist on undocumented residents of the state.  This study uses statistics on the Mexican-born 
population to characterize undocumented Oregonians. 
The Oregon industries that particularly rely on Mexican-born workers are crop 
production, agriculture support, textile mills, and food production, for which the labor force 
in the full employment years of 2005-2007 was 45%, 43%, 23% and 20% Mexican-born, 
respectively.  Employment in quite a few specific occupations in these and other industries are 
more than 50% Mexican-born. 
There’s significant distress and uncertainty in the Latino community about the meaning 
and impacts of SB 1080.  Migrants, staff members of social service agencies, and attorneys 
interviewed report cases of individual hardship; many migrants are fearful of deportation 
resulting from a traffic stop.  Clearly a significant number of people are driving without a valid 
driver’s license and without insurance.  Some people are obtaining a Washington driver’s 
license, and others are being lured into purchasing a useless “international driver’s license.” 
The impact to date is social, concentrated primarily on undocumented immigrants and 
their families—many of which include legal residents—who are experiencing difficulty with 
circumstances that require ID, changing their driving habits and daily routines, facing restricted 
opportunities in the labor market, and less access to education, medical care, church attendance 
and recreation. 
Law enforcement personnel report a conflict between enforcing the law and community 
policing strategies, which depend on the cooperation of the community. 
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 1.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
1.2.1 Description of the Study 
The state of Oregon recently implemented SB 1080, requiring that all applicants for a new or 
renewed Oregon Driver License or ID card provide proof of legal presence in the U.S.  The 
purpose of this study is to assess the social and economic impacts of this legislation on 
immigrant groups.  Clearly these impacts are felt particularly by undocumented immigrants and 
their families and households, but further impacts affect their employers, businesses that rely on 
their custom, social service agencies that work with immigrant communities and law 
enforcement personnel.  Smaller impacts will be felt across the state.     
This assessment of the social and economic impacts to date is based on several components, 
including: 
 a review of earlier, pertinent research;  
 a statistical portrait of Oregon’s undocumented population;  
 an interview study conducted in Spanish with nearly 400 Latino migrants;  
 interviews conducted in English with 83 respondents who were employers, owners of 
businesses that cater to migrants, staff of social service agencies that work with migrants 
and law enforcement personnel; and  
 an economic analysis.   
This chapter summarizes study findings; please refer to the following chapters for full details, 
including references.  
1.2.2 Overview of Findings 
The loss of ability of undocumented immigrants to obtain an Oregon Driver’s License or ID card 
has generated a great deal of distress and uncertainty in the Latino immigrant community, as 
well as hardship in the cases of some individuals and families.  Employers who particularly rely 
on immigrant labor — concentrated in agriculture, textiles and hospitality sectors — are 
beginning to lose key people and are worried about the future. 
The impact to date is substantially muted by two factors: 
1. The recession that hit the state, nation and much of the world in 2008 pushed 
unemployment in Oregon from just over 5% in early 2008 to well over 11% in early 
2009. The unemployment rate has fallen only to 10.6% as of November 2010.  In this 
environment, employers may experience loss of key individuals due to issues stemming 
from changes in driver’s license laws. However, there is no apparent shortage of labor for 
even the worst paid and most immigrant-intensive occupations.  Much of the decline in 
demand reported by businesses that particularly rely on migrants may ultimately be due 
more to the recession than to issues related to the loss of the ability to obtain a driver’s 
license. 
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 2. The full impact of SB 1080 will not be felt until 2016, when no one not legally present in 
the state will hold a valid Oregon driver license or ID card. The 8-year cycle of renewals 
for driver’s licenses and ID cards means that many people currently holding valid 
licenses and cards will not be able to renew them when they expire. 
1.2.3 The Undocumented Population of Oregon 
While all immigrants and some non-immigrants may find the newer, more stringent requirements 
for identification challenging, the group on whom the primary impact of SB 1080 falls is 
unauthorized immigrants. Demographer Robert Warren’s analysis of 2007 data estimates close 
to 95% of undocumented immigrants in Oregon were born in Mexico.  Another few percent 
appear to come from Guatemala and El Salvador. On this basis, we have focused this study 
primarily on Latino immigrants, particularly Mexicans.  Warren had estimated that 120,000 
undocumented immigrants were resident in Oregon in 2007.  Although most research indicates 
that movement across the U.S./Mexican border has slowed considerably since the onset of the 
recession, analysts at the Pew Hispanic Center have released an estimate of 170,000 
undocumented migrants living in Oregon in 2009; approximately 4% of the population.  The 
same report estimates 140,000 undocumented migrants working in Oregon, which accounts for 
6.2% of the labor force. 
It is difficult to obtain good statistical information about people without legal status. Analysts 
using data from the American Community Survey, designed to provide updates between 
decennial censuses, assume an 18% undercount of undocumented immigrants.  No large, 
representative survey asks about legal status.  The best statistical portrait we can create of the 
unauthorized immigrant population in Oregon is that of the Mexican-born. It’s important to 
remember that approximately 25% of the Mexican-born population in Oregon is estimated to 
have legal status.  Many households include people with different legal statuses, and immigrants 
with legal status are more likely to be captured in the data than people without. 
Undocumented immigrants appear to be very concentrated in particular industries and 
occupations.  More than half of the male, Mexican-born labor force in Oregon work in just three 
industries:  
 agriculture, forestry, and fishing; 
 construction; and  
 accommodation and food services.  
Well over half of Mexican-born women in the labor force are found in just four industries: 
accommodation and food services, agriculture, forestry and fishing; health care and social 
assistance; and food processing. 
Other key findings from the statistical profile of the undocumented include: 
 two-thirds of the Mexican-born population are in their prime working years, 24-49, as 
compared with one-third of other Oregonians; 
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  eighty-one percent live in the Salem and Portland metropolitan areas, which include 
Hillsboro, Gresham and Woodburn; 
 Mexicans are considerably less educated than other Oregon residents and more likely to 
work in the private sector;   
 like other Oregonians, 85 percent travel to work by car, though Mexicans are more likely 
to carpool, and travel farther to work on average.  
1.2.4 Findings from Interviews with Latino Immigrants 
In the summer of 2009, the authors worked with a 6-person, Mexican, academic research team to 
interview 390 Spanish-speaking migrants in a wide variety of locations in the upper northwest 
quadrant of the state, where 71% of the Mexican-born population of Oregon resides.  Interviews 
in Spanish ranged from 20 to 75 minutes, covering in detail the impact of this new legislation on 
the lives of respondents, their family members and acquaintances. 
In terms of broad descriptors, such as age, sex, national origin and occupation, the group of 
people interviewed appears reflective of the population as a whole as reflected in the American 
Community Survey data for Oregon for 2005-2007, discussed above and in more detail in 
Chapter 3.  However, the sample of people interviewed is not random, so we cannot assume that 
their answers accurately reflect the experiences of Oregon’s foreign-born Latino population.  
What’s more, not all 390 people surveyed were asked or answered every question. 
The implementation of SB 1080 is an issue of substantial concern to the Latino immigrant 
community, which accounts in large part for the very strong response to our request for 
interviews and the number of people willing to speak in depth on the topic.  Two-thirds of 
migrants with whom we spoke hold a U.S. driver’s license, 93% of these an Oregon license.   
The interview findings may best be framed within the context of issues outside the experience of 
many Oregonians. First, it is important to remember that the driver’s license does not represent 
the primary form of identification used in Mexico; that role is played by the national voter 
registration card, which includes a photo of the holder.  Less than twenty-five percent of the 
adult population of Mexico has a driver’s license.  Indeed, in rural areas, the proportion of 
drivers who hold a license may be very low, due to the time required to travel to obtain a license 
and the lack of enforcement of, or perceived need to comply with, the requirement that drivers be 
licensed. 
Second, the issue of migrants’ legal status is generally viewed much differently by Mexicans 
than by Americans.  Mexican migration is driven by the accurate perception that economic 
opportunities are far greater for many Mexicans in the U.S. than in Mexico, regardless of their 
legal status.  The fact that U.S. employers appear quite willing to hire large numbers of Mexican 
migrants is read as far more important than the legal situation.   Well-established social networks 
between the U.S. and Mexico connect new migrants to housing, employment, childcare, 
community institutions and information. 
Third, Oregon is one of several “new destinations” for Mexican migration, attracting an 
increasing number of people who perceive that the labor markets of “old destinations” such as 
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 California and Texas are “saturated.”  Oregon has also been perceived as a relatively welcoming 
state, in part due to the relative ease with which migrants were able to obtain a driver’s license or 
ID card. 
Two large themes emerged in the interviews:  
1. undocumented people are continuing to live and work in Oregon, driving without a license 
and perhaps insurance, if necessary; and  
2. individuals and families are being affected, changing their driving habits, daily routines and 
living with more fear and uncertainty, more restricted opportunities in the labor market and 
less access to education, medical care, church attendance and recreation. 
Consumption behavior may be affected, as people report purchasing fewer cars and related 
goods in particular, lower volumes of groceries and household articles if dependent on rides or 
public transportation, and forgoing purchases that require ID, such as alcohol and cigarettes. 
Driving license and insurance history: 
Only 31 percent of the nearly 100 asked reported that they had a driver’s license in their 
own country of origin.  One hundred people were asked if they’d driven without a license 
at home; 43% of men and 18% of women said that they had.  Of 325 respondents, 63 
percent reported that they have driven without a driver’s license in the United States.  Of 
279 people answering, 51 percent indicated that they have driven without car insurance in 
the United States. 
Current license status: 
Of 339 people, 62% of men and 75% of women indicated that they hold a U.S. driver’s 
license at this time. Just over 100 people said that they did not have a driver’s license and 
offered legal status as the biggest obstacle to obtaining a license.  Of these, one third said 
that they could not obtain a license because of their legal status and another third 
indicated that they could not renew a driver’s license that had expired.  
Source of current license: 
Of 220 people interviewed who have a U.S. driver’s license, 93% held an Oregon license, 
5% a Washington license and 3% a California license.  The only person who specifically 
reported obtaining a license in 2009 held a Washington license.  Two-thirds of 383 
people asked said that they knew someone who had a driver’s license from Washington, 
or another state, or was planning to get one.  Of those people who knew someone in this 
situation, 91 reported knowing someone who had temporarily changed their residence to 
obtain a Washington license, and another 73 indicated that they knew someone who used 
another person’s address to obtain a Washington license. More than 75 percent of 374 
interviewees said that they know people who drive without a driver’s license in Oregon. 
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 Concern over lack of license: 
Two hundred twenty nine of 379 responding indicated that they knew of someone who 
has been arrested because he or she did not have identification when the car they were 
driving, or in which they were traveling, was pulled over by the police. Two-thirds or 
more of people interviewed indicated that they were concerned about being pulled over 
when driving, that they took particular actions to avoid being pulled over, and that they 
believed that police were more likely to pull over drivers who appear to be Mexican. 
People are seeking alternatives to driving, which include relying on public transportation and 
asking for rides from others, which may cut into time that migrants holding licenses might have 
used for working, schooling or other activities. Many contractors provide transportation for work 
crews, particularly in agriculture. 
Respondents without a driver’s license were more likely to have been unemployed in the 
previous year than those who held a driver’s license, and people with a driver’s license fared 
slightly better than those without in other labor market outcomes.  However, people who hold 
driver’s licenses have also generally spent more time in the U.S. and likely have better English 
as well as better contacts and job information.  
1.2.5 Findings from Interviews with Employers, Vendors, Staff of Social 
Service Agencies  working with Migrants, and Law Enforcement Personnel 
Working with a group of five Portland State University graduate students, all of whom were 
trained in interviewing and qualitative research methods and many of whom spoke Spanish, the 
authors interviewed eighty-three people who included business owners and association 
managers, agricultural producers and processors, labor contractors, personnel from law 
enforcement and criminal justice, educators, health services providers and managers, staff 
members of advocacy organizations, housing and family service managers, and public agency 
employees.  Interviews ranging from 20 to 90 minutes were conducted, primarily in English. 
Locations ranged from the Oregon coast through the Willamette Valley, Hood River, Milton-
Freewater, Ontario, Nyssa, and Vale. This provided general geographic coverage to regions of 
the state home to approximately 95 percent of the Mexican-born population. 
Some categories of informants were more forthcoming than others.  Staff members of social 
service agencies were most voluble, offering many examples of cases of hardship among their 
clients resulting from the new legal restrictions on driver’s license and ID cards.  Employers and 
law enforcement personnel were the most difficult groups to interview; many declined to 
participate, repeatedly claimed a lack of knowledge or stated they had nothing to contribute. For 
the most part interviews were conducted at the interviewee’s place of work or in settings where 
privacy could be respected.  Our approach was exploratory in nature and relatively unstructured, 
seeking respondents’ own experience resulting from SB 1080, and the experience of migrants 
with whom they interacted at work.  
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 Again, two general themes emerged from the interviews: 
1. Respondents across all informant groups view the license issue in much broader terms 
than work-related transportation. Respondents raised questions of driver safety reasoning 
that, by necessity, people may drive without licenses; access to medical services; distrust 
of law enforcement; and   “hardship to a lot of US citizens who have in their family, if 
there is a spouse or a parent, someone who can’t get a license because they’re 
undocumented and I think it’s a burden on us as taxpayers because there are more of 
those people who go on welfare because their breadwinner can’t get a license, can’t 
work or is doing a lower level job because they’re driven underground”.  Attorney 
2. Widespread use of a driver’s license as a standard form of identification means that 
people without access to a license encounter major challenges to everyday activities. 
Renting an apartment, cashing a check, purchasing auto insurance, and otherwise 
verifying one’s identity typically means presenting a driver’s license.  “…..today I had a 
guy who got paid with a check, and he was having a hard time [trying] to cash it 
because…..the bank is all the way from Walla Walla and they wouldn’t let him, he was 
struggling to cash his check because [he had] no ID”.  Labor Center Manager 
Employers’ reactions were well represented by Jeff Stone, Executive Director and CEO of the 
Oregon Association of Nurseries.  According to Stone, finding a way for migrants to obtain some 
form of Oregon Driver’s License is the Association’s top legislative priority; although the 
recession has thus far buffered nursery owners from the labor shortage they feared, they already 
face the loss of key personnel and worry about the future as the recession eases and migrants 
currently holding valid licenses are unable to renew.   Agricultural employers are increasingly 
reliant on contractors who provide crews with transport, charging workers for the ride.  One 
landscaper described increased pressure on him to organize and maintain carpools for his 
employees. 
Business owners for whom migrants constitute an important market report a significant decline 
in custom, which may be due in part to the recession.  People in car sales or related businesses 
described a significant fall-off in business; those in small, general markets mentioned smaller 
sales to people now increasingly carrying their purchases home on foot or on the bus. 
Staff members of social service agencies reported on hardships to families that have lost 
significant income when breadwinners have lost jobs, or sometimes the ability to carry on their 
own small business as a hauler or landscaper.  They report people finding it harder to make and 
keep medical appointments, and less certainty about referring people on for service to other 
agencies that may require state ID. 
Law enforcement personnel described the conflict between their duty to enforce traffic laws and 
their desire to nurture ties to the immigrant community, in order to build trust and cooperation 
with the police.  Lawyers brought up the increasing incidence of deportation proceedings that 
stem from traffic stops, and the resulting fear and immobility engendered in the immigrant 
community. 
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 1.2.6 Economic Impact 
As mentioned above, the potential economic impact of SB 1080 appears to be swamped by the 
magnitude of the ongoing economic recession, which hit just a few months after the 
implementation of the law.  The full economic impact of SB 1080 will not be felt until the labor 
market returns to something approaching full employment, which is currently not anticipated by 
economists for at least two to three years, and quite possibly longer.  Recessions following 
financial crises are known to be particularly severe.  Keynesian policies to kick-start the private 
economy are precluded at the national level by the political situation in Washington D.C., and 
prohibited at the state level by the legal requirement to balance the state budget. 
To gain a sense of the potential impact of SB 1080, we have created an analysis of the impact 
using Oregon data from 2005-2007, years during which unemployment in Oregon remained 
below 6%.  We measured impacts as if SB 1080 were fully implemented, as will be true in 2016 
when all outstanding licenses and ID cards obtained before the law was changed will have 
expired.  We relied on the American Community Survey data, reported by households and 
subject to undercount. The logical alternative data source, the Quarterly Workforce Indicator 
data reported by employers, does not include information on sectors that are not covered by 
unemployment insurance, which excludes a great deal of agriculture, domestic work and other 
economic niches of interest. 
For the purposes of this analysis, we assume that the implementation of SB 1080 will both deter 
some number of undocumented workers from entering the state and lead others to leave the state, 
either voluntarily or otherwise, resulting in a reduction in the size of the undocumented 
workforce in Oregon.  The result would be a smaller labor force overall, with particular stresses 
on those industries and occupations in which undocumented immigrants are concentrated. 
Economic theory identifies three likely consequences:  
1. the substitution effect, or a reduction in the number of jobs as employers adjust their 
work processes, substituting other inputs, such as capital invested in new technology, for 
hours of labor; 
2. the scale effect, or an additional reduction in employment as employers reduce their 
output or go out of business entirely; and  
3. the wage effect, or an increase in wages as the remaining employers raise pay to compete 
for labor.   
Of these consequences, the first and third primarily affect the distribution of income, rather than 
a change in the total.  For this reason, we focus on the “scale effect,” which represents a loss of 
productive activity in the state. 
Under our baseline assumptions, we estimate that SB 1080 when fully implemented would 
reduce employment by approximately 4,200 jobs, balancing a loss of 4,883 jobs held by 
undocumented migrants and a gain of 659 jobs held by other Oregonians.  The loss of output and 
income associated with the direct impact of SB 1080 is estimated at $160 million, or 0.1% of 
state GDP.  Wages are estimated to rise 0.16%. 
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 These impacts are quite mild in the context of the total Oregon economy.  However, we find that 
the impact is likely to be felt disproportionately in certain industries and occupations in the 
agriculture, manufacturing (particularly food processing and textiles), and food service / 
hospitality industries.  Both agriculture and manufacturing losses are due in part to loss of some 
ability to export, given lower cost competition elsewhere. 
1.2.7 Evidence from Social Science Research Conducted Elsewhere 
Despite conducting a wide-ranging search, we found nothing in the academic literature 
specifically related to the economic or social impacts of different or changing state policies with 
regard to identification and undocumented populations.  A few studies discuss the impact of 
increasing enforcement of immigration restrictions, indicating that stricter border enforcement 
tends to affect the composition of the group of Mexicans who migrate to the U.S., in terms of 
their educational background and opportunities in Mexico.  Greater workplace enforcement 
under the Bush administration may have decreased employment, hours worked and earnings 
among recent Latin American male immigrants.  
We also reviewed what is known about the prevalence and utility of the identification card given 
by the Mexican consulate to Mexican nationals, the matricula consular.  This card appears to be 
difficult to forge, helpful to migrants for opening bank accounts and conducting other business, 
but is less sought after since states such as Oregon no longer accept it as adequate identification 
for obtaining a driver’s license. 
1.2.8 Conclusions 
The impact of implementing SB 1080 will not be fully felt until two factors are met: 
1. the economy has returned to something approximating full employment; and  
2. no-one who is undocumented but able to obtain a license or ID card before the 
implementation of SB 1080 still holds an Oregon license or ID card. 
By that time, we may see immigration reform at the Federal level that would completely change 
the landscape here in Oregon.  If we do feel the full impact of SB 1080, we can anticipate that 
the economic impact at the state level will be relatively mild.  Particular industries are likely to 
face some diminution of their migrant labor force, and have to raise wages in order to attract 
other workers. 
At this point in time, economic impacts appear to be negligible, and concentrated on those 
employers who are finding key employees no longer able to maintain the appearance of having 
legal status, unable to get to work, or unable to perform some aspect of the job that requires a 
driver’s license.  Clearly, some individuals have lost their ability to drive legally.  They and their 
families are feeling the pinch of reduced economic opportunities, lessened mobility, the inability 
to make some kinds of purchases and the need to take time from other activities including work 
and schooling to transport people who can no longer drive. 
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 Probably an increasingly large group of people is driving without a license, and perhaps without 
insurance.  Not only does this change the environment of native-born Oregonians, but it is 
accompanied by a growth of fear, uncertainty and wariness of the authorities on the part of the 
migrant community.  Discussions of deportations resulting from traffic stops are on the rise.   
The people with whom we spoke -- migrant and native-born -- showed remarkable consensus in 
their thinking that the loss of ability to obtain a driver’s license or ID card would make migrants’ 
lives harder but would not noticeably affect the level of undocumented immigration to the state.  
If so, the labor force is likely to be relatively little affected in terms of numbers.  This outcome is 
suggested by the experience of California and other states in which it has not been possible for 
some time for undocumented migrants to formally obtain state identification. The estimated 
proportion of the labor force of California that is undocumented is substantially greater than is 
true for Oregon at present. 
The mix of migrants may change, such that more single men and fewer families come to Oregon. 
Hardships will increase for individual migrants and their families, and challenges will be faced 
in the future by the employers who particularly rely on migrant labor. 
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 2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 PURPOSE AND FOCUS  
The purpose of conducting this literature review was to take advantage of any research done in 
other states that required proof of legal presence to obtain a valid driver license or ID card in 
advance of this requirement in Oregon.  In Executive Order 07-22, Governor Kulongoski 
asserted that “Oregon’s documentation requirements to prove identity are among the most 
permissive in the country (Office of the Governor State of Oregon 2007).” 
An exhaustive literature review was conducted to discover what is known about the impact of 
policy changes in other states that have strengthened identification requirements for the issuance 
of Drivers’ Licenses and State Identification cards. The following databases were consulted: 
Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost, EconLit, JSTOR, LexisNexis Academic Universe, PAIS 
International, and SocINDEX. The following key search words were used in different 
combinations: undocumented workers, REAL ID Act, illegal aliens, immigration, driver’s 
license, matricula consular, consulate cards, Mexican, identification, restrictions, economic 
impact, and social impact. Several reference librarians were consulted for literature search 
guidance.   
We found nothing in the academic literature specifically related to the economic or social 
impacts of different or changing state policies with regard to identification and undocumented 
immigrant populations.  We widened our purview in order to provide a context with which to 
understand recent policy changes in Oregon, creating a review of what is known about: 
(a) the characteristics of the undocumented population resident in Oregon; 
(b) the impact of legal status on labor market outcomes for Mexican immigrants in the U.S.; and 
(c) the history and uses of the matricula consular, the identification provided by Mexican 
consulates in the U.S. to Mexican nationals, as the matricula consular was previously 
accepted by the state of Oregon as proof of identification adequate to obtain an Oregon 
Driver’s License or Identification Card in conjunction with some proof of residency. 
2.2 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNDOCUMENTED 
POPULATION IN OREGON  
Researchers assume that major surveys such as the Census, the American Community Survey 
(ACS), and the Current Population Surveys (CPS), which generate nationally representative 
estimates with a high degree of statistical accuracy, cannot be relied upon completely to 
characterize the undocumented population. This following factors may contribute to this 
unreliability of data on   unauthorized immigrants: they may be wary of poll takers, move often, 
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 may live on the streets, often lack fluency in oral or written English, and increasingly may speak 
an indigenous language, rather than  Spanish or another well-known language. 
Population calculations of the undocumented drawn from these surveys are based on a process, 
termed the “residual method,” of subtracting the best numbers available for the legally resident 
foreign born from the total foreign born, and then “adjusting” for an assumed undercount, 
generally by 10 percent for the decennial census and 18 percent for the ACS (Warren 
forthcoming; Passel 2007; Hanson 2006).  Mexicans are far and away the single largest national 
group, accounting for 57 percent of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. in 2006, according to 
Passel (2007).   
In Oregon, however, Mexicans were estimated to constitute 94.5 percent of the undocumented 
immigrants in 2007 (Warren 2009).  Guatemalans account for another 1.6 percent and 
Salvadorans another 0.9 percent.  All other national groups, then, considered together, appear to 
comprise only 3 percent of the undocumented population in Oregon.   
For this reason, we focus on Mexicans as we proceed with this study on the socio-economic 
impacts of SB 1080 on Immigrant Groups.  Statistics provided in Chapter 3 center on the 
Mexican-born, of whom a substantial portion appear to be undocumented. 
2.3 LEGAL STATUS AND LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES FOR 
MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS IN THE U.S. 
It has been very difficult to say much with certainty about the labor market experiences of 
undocumented Mexican immigrants in the U.S.  As mentioned above, the undocumented are 
probably undercounted in our large, nationally representative surveys.  More challenging is the 
fact that legal status is not explicitly reported, but must be inferred by length of time in the 
country, or some other imperfect proxy.  For this reason, smaller, less representative surveys 
have been mined for evidence on the characteristics and situation of the undocumented 
population, either because the study environment is intimate enough that researchers gain the 
confidence of people who reveal their legal status, or because the study is focused on a group of 
people for whom it is a reasonable assumption that they are undocumented.  The result has been 
a lack of clarity, and some contention among scholars with different bases of information 
(Marcelli and Cornelius 2001; Durand et al. 2001). 
Among the most important of these smaller studies is the “Survey of Mexican Migrants,” 
conducted by the Pew Hispanic Center in collaboration with the Mexican government, in the 
waiting rooms of seven Mexican consulates around the country between July 2004 and January 
2005 (Kochhar 2005).  Nearly 5,000 people were interviewed, many of whom may be assumed 
to lack documentation, since a prime reason to approach the Consulate was to obtain the 
matricula consular. The Pew study used the possession of U.S. identification as an imperfect 
proxy for legal status.  Another critical source of information has been the Mexican Migration 
Project, which is based primarily on interviews with people in Mexican households with family 
members in the U.S.  For that reason it is thought to better capture more recent, short-term 
migrants than more-established residents of the U.S. who may no longer have parents or other 
close relatives in Mexico.   
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 With the passage of time and the accretion of evidence, a consensus has been building among 
social scientists as to the characteristics of the undocumented Mexican population.  An 
interesting element of this consensus has been that legal status has had relatively little impact on 
the earnings of Mexican migrants within the U.S. More important factors affecting earnings 
include years in the U.S., English fluency and strong social networks with access to work 
(Hanson 2006; Kochhar 2005). Even legally authorized Mexican immigrants tend to be 
significantly less educated than either other immigrant groups or people born in the U.S. and 
may be nearly as hampered as undocumented workers by limited English fluency and lack of 
knowledge of the U.S. labor market. Legally authorized and undocumented Mexican workers are 
members of many of the same households, communities and social networks (King et al.2010; 
Cobb, et al. 2009). 
The result of the relative lack of English fluency is that Mexican immigrants, regardless of 
status, appear to be concentrated in relatively few occupations and industries, particularly 
agriculture, construction, manufacturing and hospitality (Kochhar 2005).  For a sample of 80 
people interviewed at the Mexican Consulate in Portland, only 11 occupations defined relatively 
precisely (at the three digit level in the Standard Occupational Classification system) were 
needed to account for 84 percent of all the jobs that interviewees had been held in the U.S.  
Interviewees’ work experience was extremely concentrated in restaurant and agricultural work, 
as well as construction, cleaning and maintenance.  Women are unrepresented in a few of the 
important occupations for men, including construction, grounds maintenance and day laborers, 
but probably are found in the predominantly female occupations of childcare, practical nursing 
and domestic service, though that was not revealed in this sample (King et al.2010; Cobb, et al. 
2009). 
It may also be true that undocumented Mexican immigrants experience poor labor market 
outcomes in terms other than wages, such as unemployment.  The Pew Hispanic Center Study 
states that 38 percent of migrants interviewed reported a spell of unemployment lasting more 
than a month in the previous year, though they also assert that legal status did not seem to affect 
the likelihood of unemployment.  Certainly evidence is beginning to emerge that immigrants 
have been much harder hit than native workers by unemployment in the recent recession 
(Camarota and Jensenius 2009).  A multi-city study on the enforcement of labor standards in 
low wage occupations showed that overtime, minimum wage and workers’ compensation 
legislation was frequently ignored at the bottom of the labor market, most often for 
undocumented women workers (Bernhardt et al 2009). 
Further, it’s likely that the least successful migrants may return to Mexico, so that their 
experience is not captured in surveys based in the U.S.  According to a recent opinion poll 
conducted in Mexico by the Pew Global Attitudes Projects, forty percent of Mexicans surveyed 
reported that they know someone who migrated to the U.S. but returned because they could not 
find a job (2009). 
Finally, although we did not find literature on the impact of changing requirements for U.S. 
identification documents such as driver’s licenses, there is some evidence on the effects of other 
types of changes in policy related to immigration.  Pia Orrenius and Madeline Zavodny (2005) 
find that stricter border enforcement changed the migration cost/benefit calculus for 
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 undocumented Mexican men such that the average skill level of the group choosing to migrate 
rose, relative to all Mexican men.  They also report that greater workplace enforcement under the 
Bush administration resulted in decreases in employment, hours worked and earnings among 
recent, male Latin American immigrants, relative to similarly skilled men in other groups 
(Orrenius and Zavodny 2009).  Interestingly, they do not find a decline in the prospects of 
comparable women, perhaps because women may be less likely to come without papers, and are 
more likely to work in domestic service or other areas less affected by policy changes (Orrenius 
and Zavodny 2009). 
2.4 HISTORY AND USES OF THE MATRICULA CONSULAR  
2.4.1 Background 
Consular registration has been recognized and protected under international law for many years, 
most recently by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 (Bruno and Storrs 
2005). The Mexican government has been issuing matriculas consulares to its nationals living 
abroad since 1871. The matricula consular (MC) is an official consular identification card that 
provides protection and access to consular services, as well as helping relatives of migrants and 
Mexican authorities to locate Mexicans abroad.  
Vicente Fox assumed the Presidency of Mexico in 2000, committed to improving the situation of 
undocumented Mexicans in the U.S. by pushing for immigration reform.  An interim step, 
according to his Foreign Minister, Jorge Castañeda (2007, p. 143) was “overhauling the Mexican 
Consular Identification Card, and handing it out on a massive scale to Mexican nationals in the 
United States.”  This effort was stepped up to provide undocumented Mexicans some form of 
identification in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
The process for obtaining a MC was made more stringent, and the card itself is now much more 
difficult to forge, according to staff in the Mexican Consulate in Portland. Currently, in order to 
obtain a MC, an applicant must fulfill four criteria: (1) present proof of Mexican identity with a 
supporting document such as a birth certificate, a certificate of Mexican Nationality, etc.; (2) 
present proof of his/her identity with documents issued by Mexican or US authorities (e.g., 
passport, electoral ID, expired MC, etc.); (3) present proof of residence within the consular 
district (e.g., water bill with applicant’s name and address); and (4) pay an issuance fee of $26. 
Each MC includes an ID number and the name, address in Mexico, and photograph of the 
national (FAIR 2003). All MCs are issued for a period of 5 years.  
The MC has been accepted as a valid form of ID by many state and local government agencies 
and businesses in the US (Varsanyi 2007). The first agency to accept the MC was the Austin, 
Texas Police department. The Austin officers became alarmed at the high number of 
undocumented workers residing in the city who were victims of robbery. As the undocumented 
residents did not have valid IDs, they were unable to open bank accounts in local banking 
institutions where they could safely deposit their earnings. Instead, many would return home 
from work carrying large amounts of money and store it in their homes, which made them easy 
targets of crime. Undocumented residents would be robbed on their way home or have their 
homes burglarized.   
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 As a response to the increased crime rate, Austin Police developed a two-pronged approach: (1) 
they began accepting MCs as a valid form of ID and urged the Mexican immigrant community to 
report crime without fear of deportation and (2) they urged local Wells Fargo Bank branches to 
accept the MC as a valid form of ID with which undocumented workers could open bank 
accounts. By 2004, over 174 banking institutions accepted MCs as valid forms of ID as these 
institutions realized the lucrative economic implications of this untapped immigrant market 
(Varsanyi 2004). 
At one point, twelve states accepted the MC as one of the proofs of identity required to obtain a 
driver’s license, Oregon and Washington among them. In thirty-three states, at least one agency 
accepted MCs as a valid form of ID (Varsanyi 2007). In addition, local governments of 80 cities 
accepted the MC for obtaining a library card or a business license, entering public buildings, 
registering children for school, and accessing some public and medical services. Some 
companies began accepting the MCs as adequate identification for opening accounts for utilities, 
insurance and video store memberships (Bruno and Storrs 2005).  Some airline companies began 
to accept the MC as a valid form of ID for domestic travel (Ilbanker.com 2004). 
The acceptance of the MC had positive implications for both the local US communities and the 
undocumented immigrants. For the undocumented workers, the ability to open bank accounts 
reduced the costs of remittances. The Mexican government estimates savings of hundreds of 
millions of dollars for migrants able to send an ATM card to their families, which they can use in 
Mexico to withdraw money directly from the family member’s bank account in the US 
(Ilbanker.com 2004). 
For local US communities, the acceptance of the MCs to open bank accounts had important 
security implications. First, authorities have the ability to track the use of money and prevent 
criminal activities. Secondly, the MCs may have potentially curtailed financial “black markets” 
by decreasing the use of informal channels for currency exchange. In addition, the acceptance of 
the MCs has assisted law enforcement by helping to identify dead or unconscious individuals 
and facilitate communication with relatives of MC bearers (Ilbanker.com 2004).  
2.4.2 Current Debates about the Matricula Consular 
The current debate about the acceptance of the MC can be summarized under the areas of 
immigration, public safety, law enforcement, and homeland security (Bruno and Storrs 2005). 
The following section will briefly describe the positions of proponents and opponents of the 
acceptance of the MC as a valid form of ID. 
2.4.2.1  Immigration. 
Proponents of the acceptance of the MC argue that the MC is used solely for 
identification purposes and does not confer any type of legal immigration status to the 
bearer. The acceptance of the MC is required for daily business in areas that are 
predominantly affected by immigration. Its acceptance is beneficial not only to the MC 
holder, but also to the banks and other institutions in the area. But, most importantly, 
supporters contend that there is a growing need to acknowledge the large population of 
undocumented workers and find a way to more fully integrate them into society. They 
15 
 reason that it is better for undocumented workers to have an identity and participate 
openly in financial transactions where these transactions can be monitored, than to have 
an unmonitored segment of the population living underground and conducting business 
informally.  
Opponents of the acceptance of the MC argue that the MCs are only needed by illegal 
immigrants who are present in the US and do not possess other acceptable identification 
documents. The MCs confer quasi-legal status to the bearer and allows unauthorized 
Mexicans to live and conduct business in the US as regular citizens. Opponents believe 
that the acceptance of the MC may be a strategy that could facilitate individuals’ efforts 
to “regularize” their legal status in the near future. 
2.4.2.2 Public safety and law enforcement.  
Supporters of the acceptance of the MC claim that the MC is a fraud resistant document 
that reliably identifies the bearer. In fact, in 2007, the Mexican government replaced the 
old MC with the Matricula Consular de Alta Seguridad [Consular Identification of High 
Security, MCAS] which incorporates cutting-edge technology, holograms, and other 
embedded designs that prevent forgery (Ilbanker.com 2004). Mexico developed a 
national database of passport and consular data that checks the identity of persons 
applying for a new or renewed MCAS against large Mexican voter registration databases 
and against “stop list” records of “non-acceptable” persons (Bruno and Storrs 2005). 
In addition, supporters claim that the MCs improve public safety by helping police 
identify witnesses, victims, and suspects. The acceptance of the MC saves time and 
resources for police departments with limited budgets by cutting time wasted trying to 
identify persons with no other identification than the MC. Supporters argue that 
unauthorized persons are more likely to report crime and cooperate with investigations if 
they have some form of valid identification that will be accepted by authorities. 
Furthermore, the ability of unauthorized workers to deposit earned income into bank 
accounts, which reduces that likelihood of being victims of crime, is an immediate 
enhancement to public safety for the bearer and the larger local community. 
Opponents argue that the MCs are not secure and that Mexican birth certificates are 
easily forgeable, which allows criminals to obtain MCs. Opponents claim that the MC 
threatens public safety because police do not conduct the necessary background checks or 
take fingerprints of card holders which may conceal past criminal activity. The 
acceptance of the MCs by officers of the law may potentially allow criminals to obtain 
false identities and obtain driver’s licenses in the US, which may facilitate criminal acts 
such as money laundering and alien smuggling, while avoiding detection by authorities.  
2.4.2.3 Homeland security.  
Supporters claim that the MC improves homeland security by enabling the authorities to 
easily and accurately identify Mexican nationals in the US. They argue that 
undocumented persons who are isolated and marginalized pose a greater potential 
security threat than those who are integrated and into society. Furthermore, supporters 
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 emphasize that Mexico is not a terrorist-supporting country and that Mexicans come to 
the US solely for work purposes. Conversely, opponents contend the MC threatens 
homeland security and provides the opportunity for terrorists to move freely in the US 
without triggering name-based watch lists. 
Our investigations among the Latino population of Oregon should reveal more about the 
uses and limits of the matricula consular as a form of identification in Oregon 
communities. 
17 
 18 
 3.0 STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF THE MEXICAN-BORN 
POPULATION 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Our objective in this report is to provide the best statistical profile we can of Oregon’s 
undocumented population, since this is the group most directly affected by implementation of SB 
1080, which requires that applicants for Oregon Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards 
demonstrate that they are legally present in the state.  Because undocumented people are 
members of households, communities and workplaces that also include citizens and others with 
legal documentation, secondary impacts are felt by documented residents as well. 
It’s difficult to gain a clear picture of the undocumented population for many reasons.  All of our 
best statistics in the U.S. come from large, official, nationally representative surveys.  Foremost 
among these is the U.S. census, conducted every ten years and supplemented annually by the 
American Community Survey.  The next best source of data on individuals in the U.S. is the 
Current Population Survey (CPS), conducted monthly on a sample of U.S. households adequate 
to create estimates of unemployment and other data. 
However, these surveys do not ask people about their legal status, so estimates of the 
unauthorized population are generally made by the “residual method,” of subtracting the best 
numbers available for the legally resident foreign born from the total foreign born, and then 
“adjusting” for an assumed undercount, reportedly ten percent in decennial Census data (Warren 
forthcoming; Passel 2007; Hanson 2006).  The presumed undercount is based on the widespread 
understanding that undocumented people are under-represented in these large national surveys 
because they may be wary of official poll-takers, may move often or live in the streets, and may 
not speak well in English, Spanish, or other well-known languages. 
Undercounts are assumed to be more severe in major surveys other than the decennial Census 
because of the particularly strong effort made to include people in the Census.  For this reason, 
Robert Warren (forthcoming) -- one of the premier demographers engaged in measuring the 
presence of undocumented people in the U.S. — assumes an 18 percent undercount of the 
unauthorized in American Community Survey data. 
Despite its limitations, the American Community Survey data is the best available for a 
statistical portrait such as this one because it is the largest recent dataset available.  Smaller 
surveys, conducted by groups not affiliated with a government agency that may be able to gain 
the confidence of undocumented people and ask directly about legal status, cannot be assumed to 
be nearly as representative of the entire population. 
Robert Warren (forthcoming) has recently estimated the unauthorized population for each state 
in the U.S., by nation of origin.  His analysis is based on American Community Survey data in 
conjunction with data on legalizations under IRCA, the 1986 “amnesty” legislation sometimes 
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 referred to as the Simpson-Mazzoli bill.  Warren’s work – presented in Table 2 of this report – 
indicates that 94.5 percent of undocumented people present in Oregon in 2007 were born in 
Mexico. 
Therefore, the closest we can come to a statistical portrait of Oregon’s undocumented population 
is a profile of the Mexican-born community resident in Oregon based on American Community 
Survey data.  Warren estimated that nearly 114,000 undocumented Mexicans were living in 
Oregon in January 2007.  That is three-quarters of the total population of Mexican-born people 
estimated to be living in Oregon, but we cannot tell from the statistical data which three-quarters 
may be undocumented. 
We present in this report a statistical portrait of the Mexican-born population in Oregon with the 
reminder that information presented in each of these tables does not just capture the 
undocumented population from Mexico, but a large group of Mexicans who are here legally.  
However, Mexican-born people who are legally present in the state are probably somewhat 
better represented in this data than their relative numbers warrant. 
We have not included information on the estimated 5.5 percent of undocumented people who 
come from countries other than Mexico because their numbers are too small to yield reliable 
information. 
3.1.1 Technical Notes 
In this report, we present tabulations and graphs of certain features of the population of Oregon 
that was born in Mexico, along with tabulations of the contrasting population which is comprised 
of persons born either in the USA or in foreign countries other than Mexico. 
This analysis is based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey 
(ACS), using the Public Use Microdata Sample (“PUMS”).  The PUMS dataset is comprised of a 
subset of about half of the individual records collected by the Census Bureau in the execution of 
the ACS.  The Bureau assigns each of these records a “weight,” which specifies how much of the 
total population is represented by the individual record; these weights range in value from 1 to 
440, with a median value of 28.  We are actually tabulating the totals of these weights when we 
do the analysis. 
For the current report, data comes from surveys collected in 2005, 2006, and 2007 -- the most 
recent available.  The three surveys are pooled to obtain a larger and more statistically reliable 
sample than would be available in one year alone: 109,015 records for the state of Oregon, 
corresponding to an estimated state population of 3,687,731.  For persons born in Mexico there 
are 3,048 actual records, representing an estimated population of 150,275.  On this evidence it 
appears that 4 percent of population of Oregon was born in Mexico. 
These numbers do not include the small number of Oregon residents who were born in Mexico 
to parents who were U.S. citizens living in Mexico at the time of their child’s birth.  This small 
group can be identified and removed from the sample, because their characteristics are far more 
similar to those of U.S.-born citizens than other people born in Mexico but now living in 
Oregon. 
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 For the purposes of comparison we often provide statistical data on the non-Mexican born.  This 
group is comprised predominantly of persons born in the USA, but also includes a small number 
of immigrants born abroad in countries other than Mexico as listed by number of immigrants in 
Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Top 20 Foreign-born Populations in Oregon, 2005-2007 
Rank Country of birth Number Percent of Oregon 
population 
1 Mexico  150,275 4.074% 
2 Canada 20,107 0.54% 
3 Korea 18,116 0.49% 
4 Vietnam 15,969 0.43% 
5 Germany 15,528 0.42% 
6 China 14,073 0.38% 
7 Philippines 11,740 0.31% 
8 India 11,011 0.29% 
9 Japan 9,850 0.26% 
10 Ukraine 8,921 0.24% 
11 England 7,397 0.20% 
12 Guatemala 6,135 0.16% 
13 Russia 5,793 0.15% 
14 Romania 4,280 0.12% 
15 El Salvador 4,022 0.11% 
16 Laos 3,355 0.09% 
17 Other U.K. 3,154 0.09% 
18 Iran 2,919 0.08% 
19 Netherlands 2,582 0.07% 
20 Thailand 2,527 0.07% 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
The data from which our tables are drawn comes from a sample of the population rather than the 
entire population and therefore is subject to error. When a tabulated percentage is 10 percent or 
more of the Mexican-born sample, we can be confident that enough people are included in the 
sample for this figure to be close to the real number.  The numbers of the non-Mexican born are 
large enough that all of the percentages reported are reliable.  However, when figures lower than 
10 percent are indicated for the Mexican-born population, these values should be considered to 
be approximations.   
It should also be noted that the age distributions of the Mexican-born and the non-Mexican born 
populations are quite different.  Two-thirds of the Mexican-born are between the ages of 24 and 
49 as compared with one-third of the rest of Oregonians, as is shown in Table 3.4.  Some 
differences between the two groups stem from this difference as the Mexican-born are much 
more concentrated in prime working and childbearing ages. 
3.2 SOCIAL AND PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
As shown in Table 3.2, Mexicans are by far the biggest group of foreign-born residents of the 
state.  Because the numbers of people from other countries are relatively small, they may not be 
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 captured completely accurately in this data set.  For that reason the ranking of nations and the 
exact numbers of people estimated should not be considered precise. 
As shown in Table 3.2, Mexico is also birthplace of the largest group of undocumented migrants 
in Oregon, followed by Guatemala and El Salvador. 
Table 3.2: Unauthorized Residents in Oregon by Source Country, 2007 
Rank Country of origin Number Percent 
1 Mexico  113,795 94.5% 
2 Guatemala  1,885 1.6% 
3 El Salvador  1,122 0.9% 
4 Iran 333 0.3% 
5 Canada 272 0.2% 
6 Peru 254 0.2% 
7 Honduras 210 0.2% 
8 U.K. 188 0.2% 
9 Korea 149 0.1% 
10 Philippines 123 0.1% 
11 Nigeria 101 0.1% 
12 Nicaragua 101 0.1% 
13 China 88 0.1% 
14 Chile 79 0.1% 
15 India 75 0.1% 
16 Hong Kong 70 0.1% 
17 Colombia 70 0.1% 
18 Argentina 66 0.1% 
19 Kenya 44 0.0% 
20 Poland 44 0.0% 
 All Others 1,301 1.1% 
  TOTAL  120,370 100.0% 
Source: Warren 2009c 
This table was provided by Robert Warren.  The estimate of 120,370 shown above for Oregon is consistent with 
“Unauthorized Immigration to Oregon: Annual Estimates for 1990 to 2007,” an unpublished draft provided by 
Robert Warren in July, 2009. 
Note: IRCA is the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.  The estimate of 120,370 shown above was 
distributed to countries based on the percent distributions of IRCA legalizations.  The distribution by country of 
origin in 2007 could have been considerably different than the IRCA distribution.  For example, since 1990, the 
(total U.S.) unauthorized resident population from Iran has declined significantly. 
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 Individuals born in Mexico are far less likely to be citizens than are other Oregon residents, as 
shown in Table 3.3 below. 
Table 3.3: Citizenship status of the Mexican-born and non-Mexican Born Resident in Oregon, 2005-2007 
Mexican Born Non-Mexican Born Citizenship Classification 
Men Women Men Women 
Born in USA 0% 0% 94% 93% 
Born in US Territories (Puerto Rico, etc) 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Born abroad to US citizen parents 0% 0% 1% 1% 
Naturalized citizen 12% 14% 3% 3% 
Not a citizen 88% 86% 3% 3% 
Total 89,455 
(100%) 
60,820 
(100%) 
1,741,324  
(100%) 
1,796,132 
(100%) 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
Note:  “Not a citizen” includes both undocumented and legally resident persons. 
As mentioned above, the Mexican-born population of Oregon is concentrated in the prime 
working ages of 24 to 49, as seen tin Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4: Age Distribution of Mexican born and non-Mexican born Resident in Oregon, 2005-2007 
Mexican born Non-Mexican born Age 
Men Women Men Women 
0-5 1% 2% 8% 8% 
6-11 5% 5% 8% 7% 
12-15 4% 5% 6% 5% 
16-23 15% 11% 11% 10% 
24-49 65% 66% 36% 35% 
50-64 8% 8% 20% 20% 
65+ 2% 3% 12% 15% 
Total 89,455  
(100%) 
60,820 
(100%) 
1,741,324 
(100%) 
1,796,132  
(100%) 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
Mexican migration to Oregon in large numbers is a relatively recent phenomenon, with more 
than 70% having arrived in the U.S. within the last 20 years, as seen in Table 3.5 
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 Table 3.5: Decade of entry to USA of Mexican born Persons Resident in Oregon, 2005-2007 
Percent of all Mexican born Decade of entry 
Men Women 
Before 1950 0% 0% 
1950 to 1959 0% 1% 
1960 to 1969 1% 2% 
1970 to 1979 8% 5% 
1980 to 1989 20% 18% 
1990 to 1999 38% 39% 
2000 to 2009 31% 34% 
Total 89,455 
 (100%) 
60,820 
 (100%) 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
As shown in Table 3.6, Mexican-born Oregonians are as likely to be married as other 
Oregonians, but are more likely to be living apart from their spouses, and less likely to be 
divorced. 
Table 3.6: Marital Status, Mexican-born and Non-Mexican born Resident in Oregon, Ages 16+, 2005-2007 
Mexican born Non-Mexican born Marriage Characteristics 
Men Women Men Women 
Currently Married, living with 
from spouse 
41% 50% 52% 49% 
Currently Married, living apart 
from spouse 
13% 8% 2% 2% 
Widowed 1% 4% 2% 9% 
Divorced 4% 5% 12% 14% 
Separated 4% 7% 2% 2% 
Never married  37% 26% 30% 23% 
Total 80,789 
(100%)
53,998 
(100%) 
1,363,864 
(100%) 
1,436,401 
(100%) 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
A large proportion of the Mexican-born – approximately 50% - report that they do not speak 
English well, as seen in Table 3.7.  Nearly all of the members of the Mexican-born population 
indicated that they do not speak English at home, as shown in Table 3.8. 
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 Table 3.7: Self-Reported English Language Fluency, Mexican-born and Non-Mexican born Resident in 
Oregon, Ages 16+, 2005-2007 
Mexican born Non-Mexican born English ability 
Men Women Men Women 
Speaks only English 2% 1% 91% 90% 
Speaks English very Well 23% 22% 6% 6% 
Speaks English well 23% 17% 2% 2% 
Speaks English not well 32% 32% 1% 1% 
Speaks English not well at all 19% 26% 0% 1% 
Total 80,789 
(100%) 
53,998 
(100%)
1,363,864 
(100%) 
1,436,401 
(100%) 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
Table 3.8: Language spoken at home, Mexican-born and Non-Mexican born Resident in Oregon, Ages 16+, 
2005-2007 
Mexican born Non-Mexican born Language spoken at home 
Men Women Men Women 
A language other than English 98% 99% 9% 10% 
English only 2% 1% 91% 90% 
Total 80,789 
(100%) 
53,998 
(100%) 
1,363,864 
(100%) 
1,436,401 
(100%) 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
Mexican-born Oregonians are not much more likely to have moved in the last 12 months than 
are other Oregonians, as demonstrated in Table 3.9. 
Table 3.9: Migration behavior in Previous Year, Mexican-born and Non-Mexican born Resident in Oregon, 
Ages 16+, 2005-2007 
Mexican born Non-Mexican born 
 
Migration behavior 
Men Women Men Women 
Did not move in last 12 months 69% 76% 80% 80% 
Moved from outside US in last 12 
months to current house 
3% 2% 1% 0% 
Moved from inside US in last 12 
months to current house 
28% 22% 20% 19% 
Total 80,789 
(100%) 
53,998 
(100%) 
1,363,864 
(100%)
1,436,401 
(100%) 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
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 3.3 GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION 
The Mexican-born population is found in all regions of the state, as seen in Table 3.10.  The 
Salem area is the region home to both the highest proportion of the Mexican born in the state and 
where the Mexican-born represent the highest proportion of the overall population.  The regions 
used in Table 3.10, below, are shown in Figure 3.1, on the next page. 
Table 3.10: Distribution by Region of Mexican-born Population Resident in Oregon, 2005-2007 
Region Percentage of 
regional population 
born in Mexico 
Percentage total Oregon 
Mexican-born population 
living in region 
Eastern and Central (41100) 5% 15% 
South Willamette V + North Coast  (41200) 2% 9% 
Southwestern (41300) 2% 5% 
 Salem Area (41400) 8% 26% 
 Portland City (41501) 3% 10% 
 Clackamas + East Multnomah County (41502) 4% 14% 
 Washington County + far NW Multnomah  (41503) 6% 21% 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
Note:  Regional definitions are those of U.S. Census Bureau, for “Super PUMAs”, or Public Use Micro-data Areas.  
See Figure 3.2, below, for a map of these regions. 
 
Source:  United States Bureau of the Census 2008a 
Note:  These are the regions used in Table 3.10. 
Figure 3.1:  Map of Census “Super PUMA” Regions in Oregon 
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 3.4 EDUCATION AND SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 
The Mexican-born population is much less educated than the non-Mexican born population, as 
seen in Table 3.11.  However, Mexican-born children aged 6 to 15 are just as likely to be 
enrolled in school as are non-Mexican born children, though Mexican born enrollment rates 
decline at high school and college age, as shown in Table 3.12. 
Table 3.11: Lifetime educational attainment by age, Mexican-born and Non-Mexican born Resident in 
Oregon, Ages 16+, 2005-2007 
Mexican born 
Men Women 
Educational attainment 
16-18 19-24 25+ 16-18 19-24 25+ 
None 0% 1% 6% 1% 2% 6% 
Nursery to 4th grade 7% 3% 10% 0% 3% 9% 
Grades 5 and 6 7% 23% 22% 4% 10% 23% 
Grade 7 through some high school 69% 34% 26% 75% 30% 30% 
High school grad 14% 25% 24% 12% 39% 20% 
Some college 4% 13% 9% 8% 16% 9% 
Bachelors or more 0% 1% 3% 0% 0% 3% 
Total 3,219 
(100%) 
12,168 
(100%) 
65,402 
(100%)
1,900 
(100%) 
6,487 
(100%) 
45,611 
(100%) 
Non-Mexican born 
Men Women 
 
16-18 19-24 25+ 16-18 19-24 25+ 
None 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Nursery to 4th grade 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Grades 5 and 6 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Grade 7 through some high school 80% 11% 9% 74% 9% 8% 
High school grad 15% 37% 27% 17% 30% 28% 
Some college 5% 44% 33% 9% 49% 35% 
Bachelors or more 0% 7% 30% 0% 11% 28% 
Total 75,488 
(100%) 
134,966 
(100%) 
1,153,4
10 
(100%)
71,849 
(100%) 
132,450 
(100%) 
1,232,10
2 
(100%) 
Source:  United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
Table 3.12: Current school enrollment by age, Mexican-born and Non-Mexican born Resident in Oregon, 
Ages 6+, 2005-2007 
Mexican born Non Mexican born Age range enrolled in 
school 
Men Women Men Women 
6-15 98% 98% 97% 97% 
16-18 68% 85% 87% 90% 
19-24 13% 14% 41% 44% 
25+ 4% 6% 5% 5% 
Source:  United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
Note:  Percentages shown are the percentage of the population in each age group that is enrolled in school. 
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 3.5 WORK AND EMPLOYMENT  
As seen in Table 3.13, Mexican-born men are substantially more likely to be employed than are 
non-Mexican born men, related to the fact that relatively few Mexican-born, male Oregonians 
are of retirement age, receiving disability payments or attending college.  Mexican-born women 
appear slightly less like to be employed than non-Mexican born women, indicating that working-
age Mexican born women are less likely to be employed than other working-age Oregonian 
women. 
Table 3.13: Current employment status, Mexican-born and Non-Mexican born Resident in Oregon, Ages 16 
65, 2005-2007 
Mexican born Non-Mexican born Current employment status 
Men Women Men Women 
Civilian, currently working  82% 50% 63% 53% 
Civilian, with a job but not   
 currently working 
2% 3% 1% 2% 
Unemployed 4% 6% 5% 4% 
Working In the armed forces 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Not in labor force 11% 42% 30% 42% 
Total 80,789 (100%) 53,998 (100%) 1,363,864 
(100%) 
1,436,401 
(100%) 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
Table 3.14: When Last Employed, Mexican-born and Non-Mexican born Resident in Oregon, Ages 16 65, 
2005-2007 
Mexican born Non-Mexican born When last employed 
Men Women Men Women 
Within 12 months 92% 63% 75% 64% 
Between 1 and 5 years ago 3% 7% 7% 9% 
Over 5 years ago or never 5% 30% 18% 28% 
Total 80,789 (100%) 53,998 (100%) 1,363,864 
(100%) 
1,436,401 
(100%) 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
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 Table 3.15: Usual Hours Worked per Week during Previous 12 months, Mexican-born and Non-Mexican 
born Members of the Labor Force in Oregon, Ages 16+, 2005-2007 
Mexican born Non-Mexican born Range of usual 
hours worked Men Women Men Women 
0-9 1% 4% 3% 6% 
10-19 1% 7% 6% 13% 
20-29 5% 15% 8% 14% 
30-39 71% 65% 50% 50% 
40-49 14% 6% 21% 12% 
50-59 5% 2% 8% 4% 
60-69 2% 1% 2% 1% 
70-79 1% 0% 1% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90+ 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Total  74,392 
(100%) 
33,969 
(100%) 
1,018,770 
(100%)
912,858 
(100%) 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
Table 3.16: Number of Weeks worked in Previous Year, Mexican-born and Non-Mexican born Members of 
the Labor Force in Oregon, Ages 16+, 2005-2007 
Mexican born Non-Mexican born Number of weeks 
worked Men Women Men Women 
1-9 3% 10% 5% 6% 
10-19 3% 7% 5% 6% 
20-29 8% 11% 6% 7% 
30-39 5% 7% 5% 8% 
40-53 81% 65% 79% 73% 
Total 74,392 
(100%) 
33,969 
(100%) 
1,018,770 
(100%) 
912,858 
(100%) 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
As shown in Table 3.17, the proportion of Mexican-born residents employed in the private sector 
is much higher than for other Oregonians, particularly for men.  Presumably it’s much more 
difficult for an undocumented person to obtain work in the public sector than in the private, and 
the preponderance of public sector employment requires a high level of education and strong 
English fluency. 
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 Table 3.17: Employer characteristics, Mexican-born and Non-Mexican born Members of the Labor Force in 
Oregon, Ages 16+, 2005-2007 
Mexican born Non-Mexican born Employment classification 
Men Women Men Women 
Employed in a for-profit company 91% 83% 67% 60% 
Employed in a nonprofit 2% 4% 5% 11% 
Employed by local government  1% 3% 6% 9% 
Employed by state government  1% 2% 4% 5% 
Employed by federal government  0% 0% 2% 2% 
Self employed in a non-incorporated business 3% 5% 10% 9% 
Self-employed in an incorporated business 1% 1% 5% 2% 
Working for a family enterprise but not getting paid 0% 0% 0% 1% 
Unemployed 0% 1% 0% 1% 
Total 76,688 
(100%)
38,187 
(100%) 
1,121,275 
(100%) 
1,047,25
6 (100%) 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
3.6 TRANSPORTATION TO WORK 
As mentioned above and shown in Table 3.18, the Mexican-born rely on cars and motorcycles as 
transportation to work at the same high rates as do other Oregonians.  According to the data 
presented in Table 3.19, the Mexican-born have slightly longer but comparable commutes to 
work as do other Oregonians. 
 As seen in Table 3.20, the Mexican-born are somewhat more likely to carpool to work than are 
other Oregon residents. 
Table 3.18: Means of transportation to work, Mexican-born and Non-Mexican born Members of the Labor 
Force in Oregon, Ages 16+, 2005-2007 
Mexican born Non-Mexican born Means of transportation 
Men Women Men Women 
Bicycle and walk 4% 5% 6% 5% 
Car and motorcycle 86% 84% 84% 84% 
Other 0% 1% 1% 1% 
Public transportation 4% 8% 4% 5% 
Work at home 6% 3% 5% 7% 
Total 66,236 
(100%) 
26,760 
(100%) 
867,094 
(100%) 
756,426 
(100%) 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
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 Table 3.19: One-Way Travel time to work, Mexican-born and Non-Mexican born Members of the Labor 
Force in Oregon, Ages 16+, 2005-2007 
Mexican born Non-Mexican born Travel time (minutes) 
Men Women Men Women 
0-9 10% 14% 17% 20% 
10-19 30% 41% 32% 35% 
20-29 21% 18% 21% 20% 
30-39 22% 17% 15% 13% 
40-49 8% 7% 8% 7% 
50-59 1% 1% 1% 1% 
60-69 5% 2% 3% 2% 
70-79 0% 0% 1% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-99 2% 0% 1% 0% 
100+ 1% 0% 1% 1% 
Total 62,270 
(100%) 
26,091 
(100%) 
825,345 
(100%)
706,968 
(100%) 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
Table 3.20: Vehicle occupancy patterns for journey to work, Mexican-born and Non-Mexican born Members 
of the Labor Force in Oregon Who Travel to Work by Car, Ages 16+, 2005-2007 
Mexican born Non-Mexican born Number of 
persons per 
vehicle 
Men Women Men Women 
1 67% 71% 87% 88% 
2 21% 22% 11% 10% 
3 8% 5% 1% 1% 
4 4% 1% 0% 0% 
5 1% 1% 0% 0% 
6 0% 0% 0% 0% 
7 0% 0% 0% 0% 
8 0% 0% 0% 0% 
9 0% 0% 0% 0% 
10+ 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Total 56,916 
(100%) 
22,432 
(100%)
728,083 
(100%) 
632,423 
(100%) 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
3.7 DETAILED INDUSTRY AND OCCUPATION 
The tables in this section demonstrate the industrial and occupational concentration of the 
Mexican-born discussed in other sections of this report. 
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 Table 3.21: Distribution by Industry, Mexican-born and Non-Mexican born Members of the Labor Force in 
Oregon, Ages 16+, 2005-2007 
Mexican born Non-Mexican born NAICS Code (2 digit) 
Men Women Men Women 
11  Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting 24% 14% 4% 2% 
21  Mining 0% 0% 0% 0% 
22  Utilities 0% 0% 1% 0% 
23  Construction 18% 1% 13% 2% 
31  Manufacturing -- food processing and 
textiles 
4% 11% 2% 1% 
32  Manufacturing -- wood based products 6% 2% 5% 2% 
33  Manufacturing – metals, high tech, 
machinery and other 
7% 5% 9% 3% 
3M Manufacturing not specified 1% 0% 0% 0% 
42  Wholesale trade 5% 5% 4% 2% 
44  Retail trade 4% 3% 9% 8% 
45  Retail trade 1% 4% 3% 5% 
48  Transportation and trucking 1% 0% 4% 1% 
49  Warehousing and letter transportation 1% 1% 1% 1% 
4M Retail – misc and unspecified 0% 0% 1% 1% 
51  Information services and industries 0% 0% 2% 2% 
52  Finance and insurance 0% 2% 3% 5% 
53  Real estate 1% 1% 2% 3% 
54  Professional, scientific and technical services 0% 1% 6% 6% 
55  Management 0% 0% 0% 0% 
56  Waste services and administrative services 9% 6% 5% 4% 
61  Educational services 1% 3% 5% 11% 
62  Health care and social assistance 1% 11% 5% 19% 
71  Arts and entertainment 0% 1% 2% 2% 
72  Accommodation and food services 11% 23% 5% 9% 
81  Other services 3% 4% 4% 6% 
92  Public administration/ government 0% 1% 5% 5% 
99 Non-classifiable establishments 0% 1% 0% 1% 
Total 76,688 
(100%) 
38,187 
(100%) 
1,121,275 
(100%) 
1,047,256 
(100%) 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
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 Table 3.22a: Most Important 20 Detailed Industries of Employment, Mexican-born Members of the Labor 
Force in Oregon by Sex, Ages 16+, 2005-2007 
Men Women Rank 
NAICS Percent 
of LF 
NAICS Percent 
of LF 
1 23 Construction 18% 722Z Restaurants, etc 18% 
2 111 Crop production 17% 111  Crop production 12% 
3 722Z Restaurants etc 11% 3114 Fruit and vegetable processing 6% 
4 56173 Landscaping 7% 5617Z Landscaping 4% 
5 115 Agriculture support 5% 7211 Hotels, etc 4% 
6 112 Animal production 3% 6244 Child care 3% 
7 3211 Sawmills, etc 2% 4244 Wholesale groceries 3% 
8 4244 Wholesale groceries 2% 6111 Elementary schools 3% 
9 337 Furniture mfg. 2% 623M Residential medical care 2% 
10 8111Z Automotive maintenance 2% 814 Private household service 2% 
11 3114 Fruit and vegetable processing 1% 311M2 Seafood processing 2% 
12 5617Z Construction support 1% 45211 Retail department stores 2% 
13 334M2 Electronics mfg. 1% 9920 Unemployed for 5+ years 1% 
14 3219ZM Misc. wood products mfg. 1% 4451 Retail grocery stores 1% 
15 4249Z Wholesale agric. supplies 1% 622 Hospitals 1% 
16 4411 Automobile dealerships 1% 334M2 (Electronics mfg. 1% 
17 531 Real estate 1% 4249Z (Miscellaneous wholesale 1% 
18 3MS Unspecified mfg. 1% 337 (Furniture manufacturing 1% 
19 611M1 Colleges and universities 1% 8123 (Laundry services 1% 
20 484 Truck transportation 1% 531 (Real estate 1% 
Total 59,679 
(78%) 
 
 
27,293 
(72%) 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
Note:  The remaining 22 percent of Mexican-born men in the labor force and 28 percent of Mexican-born women in 
the labor force work in other industries, of which there are more than 1800 specified in the NAICS code. 
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 Table 3.22b: Most Important 20 Detailed Industries of Employment, non-Mexican born Members of the 
Labor Force in Oregon by Sex, Ages 16+, 2005-2007 
 Men Women 
Rank NAICS Percent of 
LF 
NAICS Percent 
of LF 
1 23  Construction 13% 6111 Elementary schools 8% 
2 722Z Restaurants, etc 4% 722Z Restaurants, etc 7% 
3 6111 Elementary and secondary 
schools 
3% 622 Hospitals 5% 
4 611M1 Colleges and universities 2% 611M1 Colleges and universities 3% 
5 4451 Retail grocery stores 2% 45211 Retail department stores 2% 
6 334M2 Electronic mfg. 2% 4451  Retail grocery stores 2% 
7 484  Truck transportation 2% 6244  Child care 2% 
8 92MP Public safety, administration of 
justice 
2% 531  Real estate 2% 
9 531 Real estate 2% 524  Insurance 2% 
10 622  Hospitals 2% 23  Construction 2% 
11 5413  Architectural services 1% 6211  Physician offices 2% 
12 4411  Automobile dealerships 1% 52M1  Savings institutions 2% 
13 111  Crop production 1% 623M  Residential care facilities 2% 
14 5415  Computer services 1% 6231  Nursing care facilities 2% 
15 8111Z  Automotive repair 1% 6241  Social work 1% 
16 56173  Landscaping 1% 7211  Hotels, etc  1% 
17 713Z  Other amusement incl. gambling 1% 713Z  Other amusement incl. 
gambling 
1% 
18 45211  Retail department stores 1% 92MP  Public safety, administration of 
justice 
1% 
19 3211  Sawmills, etc 1% 812112  Beauty salons 1% 
20 4441Z  Retail building supplies 1% 814  Private household service 1% 
Total 503,793 
(45%) 
 525,772 
(50%) 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
Note: The remaining 55 percent of non-Mexican born men in the labor force and 50 percent of non-Mexican born 
women in the labor force work in other industries, of which there are more than 1800 specified in the NAICS code. 
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 Table 3.23: Distribution by Occupation, Mexican-born and Non-Mexican born Members of the Labor Force 
in Oregon, Ages 16+, 2005-2007 
 Mexican born Non-Mexican born 
2 Digit SOC code Men Women Men Women 
11  Management 3% 2% 10% 7% 
13  Business and financial operations 0% 0% 3% 4% 
15  Computer and mathematical 0% 0% 3% 1% 
17  Architecture and engineering 1% 0% 3% 1% 
19  Life, physical, and social science 0% 0% 1% 1% 
21  Community and social services 0% 0% 1% 2% 
23  Legal 0% 0% 1% 1% 
25  Education, training, and library 0% 2% 3% 8% 
27  Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media 0% 0% 2% 2% 
29  Healthcare practitioners and technical 0% 0% 2% 6% 
31  Healthcare support  0% 2% 0% 4% 
33  Protective service 0% 0% 3% 1% 
35  Food preparation and serving related 10% 16% 4% 7% 
37  Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance 12% 15% 4% 3% 
39  Personal care and service 0% 6% 2% 7% 
41  Sales and related 3% 8% 11% 13% 
43  Office and administrative support 3% 7% 7% 23% 
45  Farming, fishing, and forestry 22% 17% 2% 1% 
47  Construction and extraction 18% 1% 11% 1% 
49  Installation, maintenance, and repair 3% 0% 6% 0% 
51  Production 13% 16% 9% 4% 
53  Transportation and material moving 11% 5% 10% 2% 
55  Military specific 0% 0% 0% 0% 
99  Unemployed with no work experience 0% 1% 0% 1% 
Total 76,688 
(100%) 
38,187 
(100%) 
1,121,275  
(100%) 
1,047,256 
(100%) 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
35 
 Table 3.24a: Most Important 20 Detailed Occupations, Mexican-born Members of the Labor Force in 
Oregon by Sex, Ages 16+, 2005-2007 
 Men Women 
Rankin
g 
SOC code and description Percent 
of LF 
SOC code and description Percent 
of LF 
1 4520XX Misc. agricultural 20% 4520XX Misc. agricultural 12% 
2 373010 Grounds maintenance 7% 372012  Maids and housekeepers 8% 
3 472061 Construction labor 5% 352010 Cooks 6% 
4 352010 Cooks 5% 412010 Cashiers 5% 
5 472031 Carpenters 5% 37201X Janitors 5% 
6 537062 Material handlers 4% 5191XX Misc. production 4% 
7 37201X Janitors 3% 452041  Agricultural graders and 
sorters 
4% 
8 5191XX Misc. production 3% 399011 Child care 4% 
9 533030 Delivery and truck drivers 2% 537064 Hand packers and packagers 3% 
10 512090 Misc. assemblers and 
fabricators 
2% 352021 Food preparation 3% 
11 472080 Drywall installers 2% 359021 Dishwashers 2% 
12 472141 Painters 2% 519111 Packaging workers 2% 
13 537051 Industrial truck operators 1% 411011 Retail supervisors 2% 
14 537061 Vehicle cleaners 1% 353031 Waitresses 2% 
15 435071 Shipping and receiving 
clerks 
1% 399021 Personal and home care aides 2% 
16 514XXX Misc. industrial metal 
workers 
1% 999920 Unemployed 5+ years 1% 
17 472181 Roofers 1% 537062 Material handlers 1% 
18 359021 Dishwashers 1% 519061 Manufacturing sorters 1% 
19 353031 Waiters 1% 512090 Misc. assemblers and 
fabricators 
1% 
20 352021 Food preparation 1% 511011 Production supervisors 1% 
Total  53,526 
(70%) 
 26,447 
(69%) 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
Note:  The remaining 30 percent of Mexican-born men in the labor force and 31 percent of Mexican-born women in 
the labor force work in other occupations, of which there are 820 in the SOC code. 
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 Table 3.24b: Most Important 20 Detailed Occupations, non-Mexican born Members of the Labor Force in 
Oregon by Sex, Ages 16+, 2005-2007 
 Men Women 
Ranking SOC code and description Percent 
of LF 
SOC code and description Percent 
of LF 
1 533030 Delivery and truck drivers 4% 436010 Secretaries and administrative 
assistants 
5% 
2 537062 Material handlers 3% 412010 Counter and rental clerks 3% 
3 411011 Retail supervisors 2% 412031 Retail salespersons 3% 
4 412031 Retail salespersons 2% 252020 Elementary and Middle School 
Teachers 
3% 
5 472031 Carpenters 2% 291111 Registered nurses 3% 
6 37201X Janitors 2% 433031 Bookkeeping, accounting, and 
auditing clerks 
3% 
7 472061 Construction laborers 2% 434051 Payroll and timekeeping clerks 2% 
8 1191XX Misc. managers 2% 353031 Waitresses 2% 
9 414010 Sales representatives 2% 399011 Child care workers 2% 
10 373010 Grounds maintenance 
workers 
1% 411011 First-line supervisors/ managers 
of retail sales workers 
2% 
11 471011 Construction supervisors 1% 399021 Personal and home care aides 2% 
12 352010 Cooks 1% 434171 Receptionists and information 
clerks 
2% 
13 119021 Construction managers 1% 311010 Nursing, psychiatric, and home 
health aides 
2% 
14 5191XX Misc. production 
workers 
1% 259041 Teacher assistants 2% 
15 435081 Stock clerks 1% 372012 Maids and housekeeping 
cleaners 
2% 
16 434051 Payroll clerks 1% 431011 First-line supervisors/ managers 
of office support workers 
2% 
17 412010 Cashiers 1% 439061 Office clerks, general 1% 
18 411012 Non-retail sales 
supervisors 
1% 132011 Accountants and auditors 1% 
19 512090 Misc. assemblers and 
fabricators 
1% 1191xx Miscellaneous managers 1% 
20 252020 Elementary and middle 
school teachers 
1% 352010 Cooks 1% 
Total  381,19
3 
(34%) 
 462,90
3  
(44%) 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
Note:  The remaining 66 percent of non-Mexican born men in the labor force and 56 percent of non-Mexican born 
women in the labor force work in other occupations, of which there are 820 in the SOC code. 
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 3.8 INCOMES 
As shown in Table 3.25, the Mexican-born are more clustered in lower wage categories than are 
most other Oregonians, though not in the very lowest categories, presumably related to the very 
low proportion of older people among the Mexican-born. 
Table 3.25: Total wages, salaries, commissions, bonuses and tips in last 12 Months, 
Mexican-born and Non-Mexican born Members of the Labor Force in Oregon, Ages 16+, 2005-2007  
Mexican born Non-Mexican born Income (dollars) in last 12 
months Men Women Men Women 
0 4% 8% 10% 9% 
1-4999 5% 15% 7% 11% 
5000-9999 8% 17% 6% 9% 
10000-14999 19% 22% 6% 10% 
15000-19999 19% 18% 6% 9% 
20000-24999 14% 10% 6% 9% 
25000-29999 12% 4% 6% 8% 
30000-34999 7% 3% 7% 8% 
35000-39999 4% 1% 6% 5% 
40000-44999 3% 1% 6% 5% 
45000-49999 2% 0% 4% 3% 
50000-54999 1% 0% 6% 3% 
55000-59999 1% 0% 3% 2% 
60000-64999 1% 0% 4% 2% 
65000-69999 0% 0% 2% 1% 
70000-74999 0% 0% 2% 1% 
75000-79999 0% 0% 2% 1% 
80000-84999 0% 0% 2% 1% 
85000-89999 0% 0% 1% 1% 
90000-94999 0% 0% 1% 1% 
95000-99999 0% 0% 1% 0% 
100000+ 0% 0% 7% 2% 
TOTAL 71,624 
(100%) 
31,446 
(100%) 
954,523 
(100%) 
838,291 
(100%) 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
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 As shown in Table 3.26, self-employment does not appear to be much relied on by the Mexican-
born in Oregon. 
Table 3.26: Self Employment Income in last 12 months, Mexican-born and Non-Mexican born Resident in 
Oregon, Ages 16+, 2005-2007 
Mexican born Non-Mexican born Income (dollars) in last 12 
months Men Women Men Women 
0 96% 96% 90% 93% 
1-4999 1% 2% 2% 3% 
5000-9999 0% 1% 1% 1% 
10000-14999 1% 0% 1% 1% 
15000-19999 0% 0% 1% 0% 
20000-24999 0% 0% 1% 0% 
25000-29999 1% 0% 1% 0% 
30000-34999 0% 0% 1% 0% 
35000-39999 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40000-44999 0% 0% 0% 0% 
45000-49999 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50000-54999 0% 0% 0% 0% 
55000-59999 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60000-64999 0% 0% 0% 0% 
65000-69999 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70000-74999 0% 0% 0% 0% 
75000-79999 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80000-84999 0% 0% 0% 0% 
85000-89999 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90000-94999 0% 0% 0% 0% 
95000-99999 0% 0% 0% 0% 
100000+ 0% 0% 1% 0% 
TOTAL 80,654 
(100%) 
53,998 
(100%) 
1,356,146 
(100%)
1,430,416 
(100%) 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
Very few Mexican-born residents of Oregon receive any form of public assistance, as seen in 
Table 3.27, on the next page, though the Mexican-born are clustered in the lowest several 
categories of income from all sources, as shown in Table 3.28. 
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 Table 3.27: Public Assistance Income in the Previous 12 months, Mexican-born and Non-Mexican born 
Residents in Oregon, Ages 16+, 2005-2007 
Mexican born Non-Mexican born Income (dollars) in last 
12 months Men Women Men Women
0 99% 97% 99% 98% 
1-4999 1% 2% 1% 2% 
5000-9999 0% 1% 0% 0% 
10000-14999 0% 0% 0% 0% 
15000+ 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Total 80,789 
(100%) 
53,998 
(100%)
1,363,864  
(100%)
1,436,401 
(100%)
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
Note:  The questionnaire reads “Any public assistance or welfare payments from the state or local welfare office?”  
Social security income is not included. 
Table 3.28: Total Income from All Sources in the Previous 12 Months, Mexican-born and Non-Mexican born 
Residents in Oregon, Ages 16+, 2005-2007 
Mexican born Non-Mexican born Income (dollars) in last 
12 months Men Women Men Women 
0 6% 32% 6% 12% 
1-4999 6% 14% 8% 11% 
5000-9999 9% 14% 7% 14% 
10000-14999 18% 15% 8% 11% 
15000-19999 18% 11% 7% 9% 
20000-24999 14% 6% 7% 8% 
25000-29999 11% 3% 7% 7% 
30000-34999 7% 2% 7% 6% 
35000-39999 4% 1% 6% 4% 
40000-44999 2% 1% 6% 4% 
45000-49999 2% 0% 4% 3% 
50000-54999 2% 0% 5% 2% 
55000-59999 1% 0% 3% 2% 
60000-64999 1% 0% 3% 2% 
65000-69999 0% 0% 2% 1% 
70000-74999 0% 0% 2% 1% 
75000-79999 0% 0% 2% 1% 
80000-84999 0% 0% 1% 1% 
85000-89999 0% 0% 1% 0% 
90000-94999 0% 0% 1% 0% 
95000-99999 0% 0% 1% 0% 
100000+ 0% 0% 7% 2% 
TOTAL 80,789 
(100%) 
53,998 
(100%) 
1,361,834 
(100%) 
1,434,363 
(100%) 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census 2008b 
Note:  Including wages, public assistance, social security, retirement, investment, rental, and self-employment 
income. 
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 4.0 INTERVIEWS WITH LATINO MIGRANTS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter presents the findings resulting from an interview study with nearly 400 Spanish-
speaking migrants during the summer of 2009.  According to recent estimates by Robert Warren, 
one of the premier demographers working to measure the flow of unauthorized immigrants to the 
U.S., 94.5% of unauthorized immigrants resident in Oregon were born in Mexico.  Another 2.5% 
are estimated to come from Guatemala and El Salvador.  Since these three countries represent 
the top three sources of undocumented migrants living in Oregon, and account for an estimated 
97% of Oregon’s undocumented population, we focused particularly on Latino immigrant 
networks with an emphasis on Mexicans for this interview study. 
The DMV’s Latino Task Group was extremely helpful with our efforts to interview Spanish-
speaking migrants in Oregon.  Mary King spoke with several members of the Task Group and 
their contacts, as well as the Mexican Consul, Enrique Romero Cuevas; consulate staff member 
for Community Affairs, Ursula Rojas Weiser; and Ramon Ramirez of PCUN and Francisco 
Lopez of CAUSA to improve our understanding of the kinds of issues that should be addressed 
in the interview questionnaire. The assistance of Task Group members was also invaluable in 
facilitating access to groups of people to interview. 
In order to gain the confidence of migrants, and more accurate information, we worked with a 
Mexican research team, two faculty members and four graduate students from the Instituto 
Tecnológico de Oaxaca, who spent two weeks in Oregon between July 20th and August 4th 
interviewing nearly 400 people.  We interviewed far more people than we had intended to during 
this period, in large part due to community response to the issue; many people are very 
concerned and hopeful of a change in policy. 
Interviews were conducted in Spanish, lasting from 20 to 75 minutes, in venues including the 
waiting room of the Mexican Consulate in Portland and a “Mobile Consulate” held in Albany; a 
farm labor camp in Hillsboro; the Latino flea markets in Gresham; migrant housing programs in 
Portland, Hillsboro, Woodburn and Molalla; an educational program for Latinas in Forest Grove; 
the Day Labor Center in Portland; a church in Hood River; a library in Rockwood; a Spanish-
language driver education course in Gresham; the Legal Aid Services Farm Worker Program in 
Woodburn; Blue Lake Park in Trout Lake and Woodburn’s Fiesta Mexicana. 
Although interviews were completed with 390 people, it’s difficult to say how well their 
experience represents that of entire population of Spanish-speaking immigrants in the state.  
Warren has estimated that nearly 117,000 undocumented people born in Mexico, Guatemala and 
El Salvador were living in Oregon as of 2007, which represented 97 percent of the 
undocumented and 73 percent of the Mexicans, Guatemalans and El Salvadorans living in 
Oregon.  That means that we interviewed about one quarter of one percent of the population of 
Mexican, Guatemalan and Salvadoran immigrants. 
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 Interviews with such a small proportion of the population may be considered representative of 
the larger group if it is possible to select the interviewees through a random process.  However, 
random selection cannot be accomplished with a population that is hidden in the way that people 
without documents are.  Even our very best national survey, the decennial census, is assumed to 
significantly undercount people without legal status.  Researchers assume a ten percent 
undercount, though census takers make a considerable effort to go door-to-door, following up on 
mailed surveys, and attempt to count people living in the street.   Not only are many 
undocumented people likely to avoid surveyors, others move often, may not have a phone, may 
share quarters with a large number of people, and may not speak English, or even another widely 
used language such as Spanish. 
The geographical distribution of the interviewees is less worrying, because 71 percent of the 
Mexican-born – who constitute nearly 95 percent of the undocumented – are estimated to live in 
the four census “Super PUMA” regions that constituted the bulk of our interview locations.  
These include Marion, Multnomah, Washington, Clackamas, Yamhill, and Polk Counties.  We 
additionally interviewed people in Hood River, which also has a sizeable Latino community (see 
Chapter 3 for details). 
While we interviewed a total of 390 people, not everyone answered every question, either 
because they declined to answer a question on the long interview guide, or because we did not 
include the question on a shorter interview form.  We used two different interview guides of 
different lengths for different situations.  Most of the interviews were conducted one-on-one, 
lasting as long as an hour and a quarter, using the long form.  In other situations—in two visits to 
migrant housing, in the church in Hood River and the driver’s education class in Gresham-- a 
group of people had gathered that was too large for us to be able to conduct individual 
interviews, and interviewees filled out shorter questionnaires with the assistance of the research 
team. 
We believe that we have done the best job we could with the resources available, and are able to 
provide a revealing view of Latino immigrant experience in Oregon.  However, the numbers we 
present below should be understood for what they are, the results of an intensive interview effort 
with a wide-ranging segment of the Latino immigrant population in networks and locations that 
include a high proportion of people without documents.  While the findings are illuminating, 
they cannot be considered representative in a statistical sense. 
4.2 INTERVIEW FINDINGS 
4.2.1 Demographic Characteristics of Interviewees 
4.2.1.1 Age and Sex 
Of the total of 390 migrants interviewed, 57 % were men and 43% women. Fig. 4.1 
shows the age structure of interviewees by sex.  Both sexes are strongly concentrated in 
the prime working ages between 20 and 50. 
The sample interviewed closely resembles the sex and age distribution of Oregon’s 
Mexican population as captured in 2005-2007 American Community Survey data 
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 reported in Chapter 3.  In that study we noted that the best data available indicated that 
Oregon’s population of Mexican-born was 60 percent male and 40 percent female, and 
two-thirds between the ages of 24 and 49, with another 20 to 25 percent in the 
combination of the other working age categories, 16 to 23 and 50 to 64. 
 
Figure 4.1 Age Structure of the Sample 
4.2.1.2  Indigenous Ethnicity 
A substantial number – 47 of 362 who answered, or 13 percent of our survey respondents 
– were members of indigenous Mexican ethnic groups as defined in the Mexican manner 
as native speakers of indigenous languages.  Table 4.1, below, lists the languages spoken 
by interviewees.  The four most important are found either in Oaxaca or Michoacán, both 
important sending states to Oregon.  Another four people reported speaking other 
languages as well (French, Chinese, Russian, Portuguese and Japanese), reflecting the 
fact that some of the Mexican immigrant population – and our sample – are quite well 
educated. 
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 Table 4.1. Languages Other than Spanish and English Spoken by Survey Respondents 
LANGUAGE FREQUENCY 
Mixteco 16 
Triqui 10 
Puerpecha/Tarasco 7 
Zapoteco 5 
Maya 3 
Huichol 1 
Chatino 1 
Nahuatl 1 
Otomo 1 
Quiane 1 
Quiche 1 
Amuzgo 1 
Chinese, Russian and 
French 
1 
French 1 
French and Portuguese 1 
Japanese 1 
4.2.1.3 Educational Background 
Figure 4.2 depicts the educational background of the sample of people we interviewed, 
though only part of the sample was asked this question.   On average, survey respondents 
had 8.4 years of formal schooling; men had slightly more education than women, 
averaging 8.6 years while women averaged 8.0.   Speaking in averages obscures the fact 
that most people graduated, either from high school, middle school or elementary school, 
so that people’s educational attainments are clustered at 6, 9 and 12 years of schooling.  
Nearly 30 percent of our interviewees had a high school education, and a few had a 
university education. 
 
Figure 4.2: Education of Interviewees by Sex 
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 The educational background of our sample is very close to the average educational 
attainment of the population in these age groups in Mexico currently.  However it is 
somewhat less than the average reported for the Mexican population in Oregon as a 
whole in our Chapter 3.  Since the figures in Chapter 3 probably over-represent the 
documented portion of the Mexican population in Oregon, it’s likely that our sample is 
capturing a larger proportion of the undocumented, who appear in other studies to be less 
educated on average than Mexican residents in the U.S. with legal status. 
4.2.1.4 Years of residence in the U.S. 
The Latino migrants interviewed have been living in the U.S. from 1 to 45 years, 
averaging nearly 12 years, though again only part of the sample was asked this question. 
Although Mexican migration to Oregon has a long history, it has increased substantially 
in the past ten to 15 years.  National research demonstrates that undocumented migrants 
as a group have not lived in the U.S. as long those with legal status, many of whom have 
been able to regularize their status over the years (e.g. Hanson 2006).  However, while 
71% of the sample of people we interviewed have lived in the U.S. less than 15 years, 
only 37 percent have lived in the country less than ten years, and only 10 percent less 
than five, as shown in Figure 4.3, below.  Based on other investigations, it seems that a 
large proportion of Mexican migrants move to Oregon from other states, such as 
California or Texas, rather than directly to Oregon from Mexico.  
 
Figure 4.3: Years of Residence in the U.S., Reported by Interview Respondents 
4.2.1.5 Year of arrival in the U.S. by Sex 
Figure 4.4, below, shows the year of arrival in the U.S. of the sub-set of our sample of 
respondents asked this question, presented separately by sex. Studies at the national level 
tie Mexican migration to the U.S. closely to macroeconomic and labor market conditions 
in Mexico.  Oregon has emerged as a later destination in the recent history of Mexican 
migration to the U.S., perhaps as labor markets in the more traditional receiving states, 
such as California and Texas, have been perceived to be “saturated.”  Recent research 
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 indicates that migration to the U.S. as a whole from Mexico has slowed, as employment 
opportunities, particularly in construction, have been much reduced by the current 
recession (e.g. Passell and Cohn 2010).  
 
Figure 4.4: Year of Arrival by Sex 
On the evidence of the experience of our sample, women have always been present in the 
migrant flow to Oregon, but have somewhat lagged men in arrival in larger numbers.  
Women appear to migrate later in the process than men, though not necessarily to join 
husbands and partners; increasingly women are coming to join fathers, brothers and 
cousins.  Women’s migration is thought to have been more affected than men’s by the 
militarization of the border, and increased dangers of crossing without documents.  
4.2.1.6 Occupation and Industry of Employment 
The spectrum of occupations reported by survey respondents appears below in Table 4.2.   
When comparing this data with that in Chapter 3, representing all Mexicans in the state 
between 2005 and 2007, a few differences emerge.  First, our respondents are more likely 
to be engaged in agricultural pursuits, and less likely to be employed in construction and 
hospitality industries than was the Mexican-born population as a whole as captured in 
Chapter 3.  
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 Table 4.2: Reported occupations of Latino immigrants interviewed, by sector, 2009. 
Sector Occupation Sample, n =382 Labor Force (%) 
By 
sector, 
    Frequency Percentage By 
activity, 
n= 315 n =325 
  Unemployed 10 2.6   3.1 
Not in the Labor 
Force 
Housewife 41 10.7     
  Student 16 4.2     
  Not specified 5 1,3 1.6 1.5 
Primary sector Agricultural worker 
including nurseries 
and packing 
100 26.2 31.7 33.5 
  Gardener 9 2.4 2.9   
Secondary sector Skilled and unskilled 
industrial workers 
35 9.2 11.1 24.3 
  Construction worker 
including housing 
remodeling 
40 10.5 12.7   
  Making clothes 4 1 1.3   
Storekeeper or 
businessman 
16 4.2 5.1 37.5
Employee in a 
commercial and 
services business 
33 8.6 10.5   
Tertiary sector 
Administrator or 
supervisor in a 
commercial or 
services business 
4 1 1.3   
  Restaurant worker 13 3.4 4.1   
  Teacher and teacher 
assistant 
10 2.6 3.2   
  Interpreter 1 0.3 0.3   
  Social worker 3 0.8 1   
  Driver and driver 
instructor 
9 2.4 2.9   
  Cleanliness worker 20 5.2 6.3   
  Babysitter 1 0.3 0.3   
  Sales representative or 
peddler 
4 1 1.3   
  Housing maintenance 8 2.1 2.5   
  Total 382 100 100,0 100 
Presumably this difference is driven both by (1) a higher proportion of undocumented 
people among our sample than among the respondents to the American Community 
Survey and (2) the impact of the recession on construction employment particularly, but 
also on restaurant and hotel employment.  
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 As reported in Chapter 3, the American Community Survey data shows seventy percent 
of Oregon’s Mexican-born population concentrated in 10 specific occupations, of a 
possible 820 in the classification scheme.  The top five for men were miscellaneous 
agricultural, grounds maintenance, construction labor, cooks and carpenters; the top five 
for women were miscellaneous agricultural, maids and housekeepers, cooks, cashiers and 
janitors.  When considering industries, rather than occupations, 24 percent of men were 
found in agriculture, 18 percent in construction and 18 percent in manufacturing.  By 
contrast 23 percent of women were employed in accommodation and food services, 18 
percent in manufacturing, 14 percent in agriculture and 11 percent in health and social 
assistance.  
The occupational classification of our sample is somewhat different, as it results from 
self-reporting and categorization by the Mexican research team, rather than by American 
social scientists.  While agricultural workers are the single largest group, they are by no 
means the majority.  Interestingly, several-just over 5 percent of the labor force — report 
owning a business, most often a restaurant or a grocery store, and one percent are self-
employed.  
4.2.2 Experience of the Sample with Driver’s Licenses in Countries of Origin 
and U.S. 
4.2.2.1 Driving and Driver’s Licenses in Countries of Origin 
Most of our respondents indicate that they did not possess a driver’s license in their home 
country.  Of the 96 people who were both asked and answered this question, only 31 
percent reported that they had a driver’s license in their country of origin.  As shown in 
Figure 4.5, below, more men than women had driver’s licenses at home, with 37 percent 
as compared to 18 percent.  
 
Figure 4.5: Did You Have a Driver’s License in Your Home Country? 
Several factors may be at work.  A number of migrants may have come to this country at 
an age when they would not yet be eligible for a driver’s license.  Many more may not 
48 
 have had access to a vehicle for economic reasons.  Women are less likely to possess a 
driver’s license in rural Mexico than is true in the U.S.  Finally, it can be far more 
difficult to obtain a driver’s license in rural Mexico than in rural areas in the U.S., due to 
the time it takes to travel to official agencies. It is far less automatic that people obtain a 
driver’s license in migrant-sending nations than it is in the U.S. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the relatively short period of time that respondents had 
driving experience in their countries of origin.  As shown in Figure 4.6, two-thirds of 
respondents reported that they had fewer than five years of driving experience at home.  
Again, the relative youth of migrants surveyed, as well as the expense of vehicle 
ownership presumably account for these findings.  
 
Figure 4.6: How Many Years Did You Drive in Your Home Country? 
When asked explicitly if they had driven without holding a driver’s license in their 
country of origin, 43% of men and 18% of women – of the 95 people who responded to 
this question—indicated that they had driven without a driver’s license in their home 
country.  
Probed further for the reasons that they had driven without a license at home, 13 people 
reported that they did so “by necessity,” 11 people asserted that they did so because they 
didn’t need a license to drive in their community due to a lack of enforcement of 
licensing laws in rural towns, 8 indicated that they were under-age when they drove, and 
2 stated that they had driven only in emergency situations.  
4.2.2.2 Driving and Driver’s Licenses in the U.S. 
Almost all of the survey respondents were asked and answered the question as to whether 
or not they held a U.S. driver’s license.  Sixty two percent of the 204 men answering this 
question indicated that they held a U.S. driver’s license, as did 75 percent of the 135 
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 women, as shown in Figure 4.7.  Thirty percent of respondents indicated that they did not 
have a U.S. driver’s license.  
Of 220 people who reported the state that issued their current U.S. driver’s license, 93% 
indicated that they hold an Oregon license, five percent a Washington license and three 
percent a California license.   
 
Figure 4.7: Do You Have A Driver’s License 
Legal status is by far the most common obstacle reported to obtaining an Oregon Driver’s 
License. Of the people who offered reasons for not holding an Oregon driver’s license, 
one-third said that lack of papers was the primary reason they had not obtained a U.S. 
license and another third reported that their licenses were overdue for renewal, but that 
they were unable to renew them, given the change in the law.  Thirteen percent reported 
that they were too young to obtain a license; three percent said that they have a driver’s 
permit; an additional 3% reported failing the driver’s test; three percent indicated that 
their license was suspended; and nine percent cited “other reasons” for the fact that they 
do not have a current driver’s license. 
Of people who hold a U.S. driver’s license, most obtained it within the past ten years.  As 
shown in Figure 4.8, of the 55 people who answered a question about the exact year they 
first obtained a U.S. license question: 
 24% indicated that they first obtained their license during the years from 2006 to 
2009; 
 42% during the period from 2001 to 2005; 
 19% between 1996 and 2000; and  
 15% between 1981 and 1995. 
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Figure 4.8: Year When Immigrants Obtained Their U.S. Driver’s License 
Although most people who answered this question indicated that they had first obtained a 
U.S. license relatively recently and the vast preponderance held an Oregon license, none 
had acquired an Oregon license in 2009, the first full year in which SB 1080 was in 
effect.  As shown in Table 4.3 below, while 40 of the 54 people answering this question 
obtained their license in Oregon between 2000 and 2008, none had an Oregon license 
dating from 2009.  The sole 2009 license holder had a Washington driver’s license. 
Table 4.3: Year that U.S. License Holders First Obtained a License, by State 
YEAR OREGON WASHINGTON CALIFORNIA 
1981  0 0  1 
1987 1  0 0  
1989 1  0  0 
1990  0  0  0 
1991  0  0  0 
1992  0  0  0 
1993  0  0  0 
1994 1  0  0 
1995 3  0  0 
1996 1  0 1 
1997  0  0  0 
1998  0  0  0 
1999 2 1  0 
2000 5  0  0 
2001 7  0  0 
2002 3  0  0 
2003 5  0  0 
2004 4 1  0 
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 Table 4.3 Continued: Year that U.S. License Holders First Obtained a License, by State 
YEAR OREGON WASHINGTON CALIFORNIA 
2005 4  0 1 
2006 1  0  0 
2007 7  0  0 
2008 4  0  0 
2009  0 1  0 
Very few respondents reported any difficulty obtaining their license.  Of the 13 people 
who did report difficulty, nine said that their difficulty stemmed from lack of proper 
papers, while the other 4 reported failing the exam.   
When asked if they thought that they would be able to obtain a driver’s license when they 
first arrived in Oregon, 63% of the 90 who responded said that they thought it would be 
possible, while 37% thought that they would not be able to obtain a license.  Those who 
thought it would be possible had been given to understand that the process was easy and 
quick, because the DMV asked for relatively little, whereas those who expected 
difficulties referred to the fact that they were unaware of the laws or that they did not 
have the papers needed. 
Something of the perceptions of migrants about conditions in Oregon is revealed in the 
list of responses that interviewees offered most frequently to support their prior beliefs 
that it would be either relatively easy or relatively difficult to acquire a driver’s license in 
Oregon, shown in Table 4.4.  It has been reported elsewhere that immigrants viewed 
Oregon as a relatively friendly destination, in part because of the fact that they could 
obtain a driver’s license. 
Table 4.4: Did You Think You Could Get a Driver’s License When You Arrived In Oregon? 
Why did you think you would get 
it? 
No. Why did you think you would 
not get it? 
No. 
It was easy and quick to get it and 
they did not ask for many 
requirements  
41 Did not have the correct papers  12 
Had all the necessary papers 5 Did not know the Laws and they 
had changed  
8 
Just had to pass the exam  3 Did not know that they were 
going to use it  
4 
Did not know the Laws 3 Do not have a car  3 
Because it was necessary to have one 2 Did not know anything about 
driver’s licenses  
2 
Because he/she is an American 
resident  
2 It was suspended  1 
  Just arrived in the States  1 
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 4.2.2.3 Demographics Characteristics of Driver’s License Holders 
Of the 321 people who answered detailed demographic questions, just over two-thirds 
held driver’s licenses.  We imagined that it might be more likely that men would hold a 
driver’s license than women, given traditional gender roles and driving patterns in 
Mexico, but women in our sample were at least as likely as men to have a driver’s 
license, as shown in Table 4.5 below.  What’s more, younger women hold a driver’s 
license in higher proportions than do younger men.  It may be that young men are more 
likely to be among the first members of their families and networks to migrate to the U.S. 
while younger women may be joining family members who are more established in the 
States, so that young women’s behavior reflects the habits of a more settled population.   
Table 4.5: Age And Sex Distribution Of Oregon Driver's License Holders 
Men Women  AGE  
YES NO YES  NO 
15-19 2 7 2 4 
20-24 7 15 20 4 
25-29 14 11 24 3 
30-34 29 10 17 7 
35-39 19 11 17 6 
40-44 21 4 14 4 
45-49 10 5 3 1 
50-54 7 4 2 1 
55-59 2 2 1 0 
60-64 3 1 0 0 
65-69 1 0 0 0 
70-74 0 2 2 2 
Perhaps also surprisingly, educational background did not seem to be important in 
determining who holds a driver’s license and who does not, at least as reflected in our 
sample. About half of the men at each level of education hold a driver’s license.  It does 
appear as though more highly educated women are less likely to have a driver’s license 
than are less educated women, but their numbers are quite small and potentially 
unreliable.    
Our assumption that people who have been in the U.S. longer are more likely to have a 
driver’s license was borne out by the responses of men in the sample, as shown in Table 
4.6 below.  This may be due to the greater likelihood that they are integrating into U.S. 
society, or that it was easier to obtain a license in previous years.  Again, women appear 
to be more likely to hold a driver’s license earlier in their stay in the U.S. than men, 
echoing the finding that younger women were more likely to have a license than were 
younger men.   
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 Table 4.6: Years Of Residence In The Us And Sex Of People Who Do And Do Not Have An Oregon's 
Driver's License 
Men Women YEAR
S YES NO YES NO 
1-4 2 7 3 2 
5-9 12 11 16 2 
10-14 8 5 13 6 
15-19 18 1 5 1 
20-24 9 1 2 0 
25-29 1 1 1 0 
35-39 1 0 0 0 
45-49 0 0 1 0 
The same phenomenon is clear when considered from the point of view of the year of 
arrival in the U.S, as seen in Table 4.7.  There is a clear pattern of greater likelihood of 
holding a driver’s license with an earlier arrival in the U.S. or with a longer period to 
regularize status and integrate into the community.  
Table 4.7: Year Of Arrival In The U.S. And Sex Of People Who Do And Do Not Have An Oregon 
Drivers' License 
Men Women YEAR 
YES NO YES NO 
1964 0 0 1 0 
1970-1979 2 1 1 0 
1980-1989 11 1 2 0 
1990-1999 23 6 18 7 
2000-2009 14 18 19 4 
As expected, people working in manufacturing, construction and agriculture have the 
lowest rates of driver’s license possession, as do people who are unemployed or 
housewives, shown in Table 4.8.  These occupations are often held by relatively new 
arrivals and undocumented people. 
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 Table 4.8. Occupation And Sex Of Oregon Drivers' License Holders 
Men Women SECTOR OCCUPATION 
Yes No Yes No 
  Unemployed 1 5 2 2 
Housewife 0 0 21 10 Not in the 
Labor Force 
Student 1 1 4 2 
Agricultural worker including nurseries and 
packing 
38 23 20 7 Primary Sector 
Gardener  6  3  0 0  
Manufacturing workers 15 14 5 0 
Construction worker including home remodeling 20 15 0 0 
Secondary 
Sector 
Making clothes 0 0 2 0 
Storekeeper or businessman 8 1 6 1 
Employee in a commercial and services business 9 5 13 2 
Administrator or supervisor in a commercial or 
services business 
0 0 2 1 
Restaurant worker 3 3 3 3 
Teacher and Teacher assistant 3 0 5 1 
Interpreter 0 1 0 0 
Social worker 1 0 2 0 
Driver and driver instructor 8 0 1 0 
Cleanliness worker 1 2 12 4 
Babysitter 0 0 1 0 
Sales representative or peddler 2 0 1 1 
Tertiary Sector 
Housing maintenance 7 1 0 0 
4.2.3 Knowledge of and Reaction to the Legislative Change 
Nearly every one of the 57 people who answered the question “Has it become more difficult to 
get a driver’s license and an ID?,” said yes: all 15 female respondents and all but two men.   
Of this group, nearly half (45%) indicated that they had learned that it has become more difficult 
to obtain a driver’s license or state ID from the media.  Eighteen percent learned from family 
members or friends, and 16% said that they found out from the DMV when applying for a 
license or ID card.  The rest reported that they learned about the policy change from a 
combination of sources.   
One hundred and five people responded to a question that asked their opinion of why the 
legislation had changed.  Of these, nearly half thought that it was a discriminatory response to 
the growing Latino and undocumented population in the state.  Several of these respondents 
went further to say that “Americans think that denying an ID or a driver’s license will help to 
stop illegal immigrants and return them to their home country.” 
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 Just over a quarter of respondents to this question did not know why the law had changed in this 
way.  Twelve percent considered the new law a security measure; ten percent offered the 
rationale that it was a response to immigrants’ failure to respect driving laws.  Two people felt 
that it was a reaction to people obtaining driver’s licenses with false papers, while two more 
suggested that the policy was designed to thwart people coming from other states to obtain a 
driver’s license. 
 
Several people interviewed shared safety concerns resulting from people driving without a 
license.  A typical remark was, "The roads would be safer if everyone had a driver’s license." 
4.2.3.1 Non-Oregon Driver’s Licenses and Driving without a License 
Nearly two-thirds of the 383 people who answered the question “Do you know someone 
who has a driver’s license from Washington or another U.S. state, or is planning to get 
one?,” (135 men and 100 women), reported knowing someone who either had a 
Washington driver's license or was planning to get one, as seen in Figure 4.9. 
 
Figure 4.9: Do You Know Someone Who Has a Driver’s License From Washington or Another U.S. 
State or Is Planning to Get One? 
Of these 235 respondents, 91 people reported that they knew people who had obtained a 
license from Washington or another state by temporarily changing their residence, 73 
reported knowing someone who had used another person’s address to obtain a license 
from another state.  Several people commented that they knew people who live in 
Washington who would help them to obtain the documents in order to apply for a 
Washington license.   
People did not seem to be pursuing International Driver’s Licenses in nearly the same 
numbers.  Although they are widely advertised in Spanish-language media, community 
leaders are attempting to educate people about the limits of these documents.  Only 17 % 
of 378 respondents said that they knew someone who normally drives in Oregon who has 
or is planning to obtain an International Driver’s License.  (More recent conversations 
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 with staff from the Mexican Consulate indicate that more people may now be promoting 
and taking up International Driver’s Licenses.)  
However, more than three-quarters of 374 interviewees said that they know people who 
drive without a driver’s license in Oregon, as shown in Figure 4.10 below.   
 
Figure 4.10: Do You Know People Who Drive Without a Driver’s License in Oregon? 
4.2.4 Changes in Driving and Insurance Behavior 
According to a member of the DMV Latino Taskforce, the recent deportations of many 
undocumented immigrants whose family members sought assistance from Woodburn’s Legal 
Aid Farmworker Program were initiated by a traffic stop for a perceived minor traffic violation.   
Although we were unable to find data for Oregon, the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Annual Report on Immigration Enforcement Actions for 2009 indicates that at the national level 
traffic offenses are the second most common category of crime involved in the deportation of 
“criminal aliens.”  A recent New York Times article (Dec. 10, 2010), “Some Unlicensed Drivers 
Risk More than a Fine” described the deportation of thousands of undocumented immigrants 
who came to the attention of authorities as a result of accidents and traffic violations. 
It is not clear whether passage of SB 1080 has increased the likelihood that Oregon police will 
stop or request identification of Latino immigrants, but it appears that many immigrants believe 
that to be the case.   
Of the 382 people who answered the question, "In the past 12 months, did you know someone 
who was traveling as a passenger in a car and the police asked him/her for an ID?", 60% of 
men (130) and 58% women (95) answered yes.   
What’s more, of a total of 379 people, 59% of men (127) and 62% of women (102) stated that 
they know someone who has been arrested because he or she did not have identification when 
the car they were driving or in which they were traveling was pulled over by the police, as 
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 shown in Figure 4.11.  An attorney with Woodburn’s Legal Aid Farmworker Program reports 
that she is unaware of passengers being arrested and ultimately deported, but that it may be 
happening.  Police may ask for ID from passengers who don’t have a legal obligation to produce 
ID but may respond in a way that leads to their detention for illegal immigration.   
 
Figure 4.11: Knows Someone Arrested For Lack of ID at a Traffic Stop 
Of a total of 368 people, 64% (134 men and 101 women) stated that when they drive they are 
worried because they could be pulled over by police, as shown in Figure 4.12.  The remaining 
36% (73 men and 60 women) said they did not share this concern.   
Of a total of 348 people, 68% (145 men and 93 women) stated that they take particular actions to 
avoid being pulled over by the police while driving or traveling in a car.  Of the 214 who 
indicated which actions they take, 104 said that they do not speed when they drive, 64 said that 
they respect all traffic laws, 30 reported that they are driving less, 13 said that they take back 
roads and three stated that they pursue several of these strategies.   
When the interviewees were asked if they think that the police pulled over more Mexicans and 
Latinos in general compared to people from other countries, 84% of 372 respondents said yes, as 
seen in Figure 4.13.  Typical comments were that  
“When police arrest drunken Mexicans, they do not receive good treatment, police take them to 
jail and then they got deported.” 
“People, who are arrested and do not understand what the papers say in English, signed 
everything given to them without realizing that those papers are their voluntary departure.” 
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Figure 4.12: Are You Worries Because You Could Be Pulled Over By The Police When You Are Driving? 
One individual who had run a stop sign received a ticket with a $510 fine because he did not 
have a driver’s license, but said that the police who pulled him over were very kind and he could 
see that they were just doing their job; he realized that not all the police are racists toward 
Latinos. 
 
Figure 4.13: Do You Feel That the Police Pull Over More Latinos Than People From Other Countries? 
People commented that: 
“Even if some people from other races are undocumented, the police do not pull them over, 
mainly because some are white, but Latinos are easily recognized and unfortunately they are 
more likely to be arrested”. 
"The American police pulled over Mexicans because they think we don’t have driver’s license, so 
they can get us out of the country." 
59 
 Of a total of 325 people, 63% (134 men and 71 women) said that they have driven without 
driver’s license in the United States, as shown in Figure 4.14.  By far the most common 
explanation given was that it was a necessity, though a few stated that they had not had time to 
obtain a license.  
 
Figure 4.14: Have You Ever Driven Without a Driver’s License in the United States? 
Of 279 people who answered the question “Do you have auto insurance?, 89% (143 men and 104 
women) claim to have car insurance, as seen in Figure 4.15. Of these, 104 answered the question 
“In whose name is your car insurance?”, with 79% (48 men and 34 women) indicating that the 
car insurance was in their own name, while 21% (10 men and 12 women) stated that the car 
insurance was in another person’s name. 
Interestingly, 40 people reported having car insurance but no driver’s license, while nine people 
told us that they had a driver’s license but no car insurance.  Two hundred five indicated that 
they have both a driver’s license and car insurance.  
 
Figure 4.15: Do You Have Auto Insurance? 
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 Of 279 people, 51% admitted that they had driven without car insurance in the U.S, including 97 
men and 45 women, as seen in Figure 4.16.  
 
Figure 4.16: Have You Ever Driven Without Car Insurance in the United States? 
4.2.5 Impact on Daily Life of Driving Changes 
When asked about the impact of the new requirement for establishing legal presence in the state 
in order to obtain or renew an Oregon driver’s license, two large themes emerged in the 
comments of interviewees.  The first was that the new law has not and will not create a big 
change in behavior; it does not stop people from driving, working and carrying on with their 
lives.  The second was that some people are reacting in smaller ways, adjusting their routines 
both as a result of increased fear of police attention and to reduce illegal driving.  Some people 
are driving less or differently, relying more on family and friends for rides or using public 
transportation and staying home more. 
4.2.5.1 Primary means of Transportation 
Driving one’s own car appears to be the primary means of transportation used by 
immigrants in our sample, both male and female, for all activities.  Sixty five percent of 
respondents indicated that they use their own vehicle for most trips, while 14% rely 
primarily on public transportation, 12% depend mostly on rides, 8% walk to accomplish 
most of their daily activities and just 1% ride a bicycle.  
These proportions hold roughly for both women and men, and for particular activities 
considered individually, as is shown in Tables 4.9A and 4.9B below.  It appears that 
people use their own cars in higher proportions for children’s activities and to take 
children to childcare, which may indicate that people with children are more established 
in the community, more likely to have legal status, and to be more prosperous.  Likewise, 
the activities that have the highest proportions of people reporting walking to include 
going to church, the store, the laundromat and, for women, visiting family and friends.  
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 Attending school is the activity with by far the highest proportion of people reporting that 
they depend on public transportation for access. 
Table 4.9a: Means of Transport Most Used By Immigrants in Oregon, Men 
Means of 
transport 
Own 
car 
Rides Public 
transportation 
By walking By 
bicycle 
Work 132 31 31 2 5 
Store 127 26 18 26 3 
Visit family and 
friends 
113 14 29 7 0 
Church 109 17 12 23 2 
Recreational 
Activities 
103 21 17 13 4 
Children’s  
activities 
76 4 5 4 0 
Laundromat 72 12 12 28 2 
Childcare 53 4 5 1  
School 49 1 15 8 4 
Other activities 53 9 10 3 1 
Return to home 
country 
40 5 50  0 
Run errands 25 2 2 1 0 
 
Table 4.9b: Means Of Transport Most Used By Immigrants In Oregon, Women 
Means of transport Own 
car 
Ride
s 
Public 
transportation 
By 
walking 
By bicycle 
Work 75 22 16 5 0 
Store 102 29 20 9 0 
Visit family and 
friends 
88 22 29 16 0 
Church 93 20 14 15 0 
Recreational Activities 82 24 10 9 0 
Children’s  activities 71 12 8 7 0 
Laundromat 57 11 6 15 0 
Childcare 49 5 5 6 0 
School 49 2 26 8 0 
Other activities 42 9 6 0 1 
Return to home 
country 
34 2 29 0 0 
Run errands 26 1 4 1 0 
When asked if they could pursue their activities using public transportation, 61% of the 
367 respondents to this question said that they could not, as shown in Figure 4.17.  In a 
follow-up question about specific activities, 84% of the 199 people who answered 
indicated that they could not pursue any of their activities using public transportation and 
another 12% stated that they could not get to work on public transportation. 
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 A small group reported on the problems with public transportation as an option, most 
often indicating that the schedule did not match their own, or that service is too 
infrequent.  A few people mentioned that using public transportation was not safe 
because they could be asked for identification. 
Thirty nine percent of people had indicated that they could carry on with their regular 
activities by public transportation.  When pressed on particular activities, the vast 
majority of this group stated that they could get to work, go shopping, get to medical 
clinic, get to school, and participate in children’s and recreational activities by public 
transportation. 
 
Figure 4.17: Could You Do Those Activities Using Public Transportation? 
4.2.5.2 Depending on Others for Rides 
Quite a few people rely on family members and friends for rides.  Comments frequently 
heard on this topic included these themes: 
"People do not have flexibility in their working hours because they don’t have a driver’s 
license, so they are dependent on a friend or relative’s schedule; this is a problem that 
causes no increases in their working hours or a promotion and therefore they don’t earn 
more money" 
"People that don’t have a driver’s license are always looking for a ride and they become 
dependent on their friend’s or family’s time" 
"People who have a driver’s license fit their schedule in order to help people who don’t 
have it" 
Knowing that many families include both people with legal status and those without, we 
asked about whether or not family members had a driver’s license.  Of 208 respondents, 
71% indicated that both they and another member of their family have driver’s licenses, 
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 as is shown in Figure 4.18.  Twenty percent reported that they had a driver’s license, but 
that their other family members did not.  Eight percent stated that while they did not have 
a license someone else in their family did, and only one percent said that neither they nor 
any of their family members had a license. 
 
Figure 4.18: Drivers’ Licenses in the Family 
Nearly 40 percent of the 72 people who answered the question, “Are there activities you 
would like to do that you do less due to transportation problems?” said yes, that there are 
activities they would like to perform and that they do less due to transportation problems.  
Of these people, men particularly indicated that they both visited family and friends less, 
and worked or searched for work less, while women were most likely to answer that they 
went out less with their children, as shown in Table 4.10.  Others noted this behavior, 
saying that   
"The people who don’t have driver’s license are afraid to go out and look for a job" 
Table 4.10. Activities They Do Less Or They Have Stopped Doing 
Activity M F 
Shopping 4 2 
Visit family and friends 6 0 
Go out with children 2 9 
Go to work or find a job 5 0 
Have fun 4 0 
Go to the adults’ school 1 0 
Only 26 people answered the question "Would you have better opportunities in your 
current job if you could drive?”, but of them all but two women said that their 
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 opportunities would increase if they could drive.  Of those who said that they would have 
better opportunities, the reasons cited were to go everywhere easily, to obtain a secure 
job, to increase their productivity and to earn a better income. 
Twenty five of the 26 respondents who answered to the question "Would you have better 
chances of getting another job if you could drive?,” answered in the affirmative, as seen 
in Figure 4.19. 
 
Figure 4.19: Would You Have Better Chances of Getting Another Job if You Could Drive? 
Of 328 people who responded to the question "When you go somewhere in a car, who 
drives?”, 69% (141 men and 86 women) drive themselves, while the remaining 31% (51 
men and 50 women) reported that someone else drives, as shown in Figure 4.20. 
 
Figure 4.20: When You Go Somewhere in a Car, Who Drives? 
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 Of 93 people who responded to the question “If someone else drives, what would you do 
if that person could not drive?” 43% (21 men and 19 women) would use public 
transportation, 34% (15 men and 17 women) would drive by themselves, 21% (9 men 
and 10 women) cancel the trip. Finally the remaining 2% (1 man and 1 woman) do not 
know what they would do in that situation. 
 
Figure 4.21: If Someone Else Drives, What Would You do if That Person Could Not Drive? 
Of 276 respondents to the question "When you drive, do you normally give rides to other 
people?” 78% (131 men and 83 women) said yes.  Of this group, 53% indicated that they 
gave rides to their spouses or partners, children and other family members, while 40% 
give rides regularly to friends and another 7% indicated that they give rides to neighbors 
and others, such as co-workers, as shown in Table 4.11. 
Table 4.11: Immigrants Give Rides To 
Person M F 
Couple, children and 
other family members 
68 45 
Friends 52 33 
Neighbors 11 5 
The most common destination to which people provide rides for others is work.  As 
shown in Figure 4.22 below, approximately one-fifth of people reported giving rides to 
go shopping or to a medical clinic, while 13% indicated that they give rides for 
recreational activities and 7% give people rides to school. 
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Figure 4.22: Pleaces Where Immigrants Go When They are Asked for Rides 
When asked if they provide rides to anyone who is afraid to drive because they have no 
driver’s license, 157, or 58%, of 271 people asked said yes.  Forty four percent of 269 
people asked indicated that they now spend more time giving rides to others than they 
had previously.  
Only 23 people responded to the question: “While taking others in your car, do you think 
you are doing fewer activities than you used to do before [implementation of SB 
1080]?”of these 74% (10 men and 7 women) said yes.  Among the activities that the 
immigrants performed less frequently because they are providing more rides than prior to 
implementation of SB 1080 are spending time with their family (5), spending time doing 
household chores (3) and taking less time to go out to have fun (3). Also, they reported 
being late to work more often (3) and pursuing fewer recreational activities (2). 
 
Figure 4.23: Do You Now Spend More Time Than Before Taking Other People in Your Car? 
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 When asked if they knew someone who goes out less because he or she is nervous about 
driving without a driver’s license, 72 percent of the 378 respondents said yes.  When 
probed for specifics, interviewees mentioned that they knew people who were going less 
often to the doctor, school, to church, as well out for fun, to the store, to other cities, to 
party and to visit friends, as shown in Figure 4.24.  
 
Figure 4.24: Destinations Visited Less Frequently 
4.2.5.3  Driver’s Licenses and Unemployment 
Interviewing during the summer of 2009, we were quite aware that many of the people 
we spoke with were affected by the ongoing recession as well as potentially by the loss of 
the ability to apply for or renew an Oregon Driver’s License or ID card.  We asked many 
people about spells of unemployment, lower earnings and loss of hours.  What emerged 
clearly is that people who did not have a driver’s license fared worse in the labor market 
than those who did.  However, it’s also true that people without driver’s licenses are 
generally more recent arrivals and would be expected to have a harder time, having fewer 
contacts and less information on average as well as being less established at work and 
perhaps less fluent in English. 
Respondents without a driver’s license were much more likely to have experienced a 
spell of unemployment in the prior year than driver’s license holders, as is shown in 
Table 4.12. 
Table 4.12: Were You Unemployed For Any Period Of Time During The Last Year? 
Number of Men Number of Women  
YES NO YES  NO 
Have DL 54 59 42 36 
No DL 45 24 16 7 
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 It does not appear that holding a driver’s license much affected the ease with which 
people found work in the last 12 months, as is shown in Table 4.13.  A total of 280 
people answered this question, but comparable proportions of license holders and non-
license holders found it either easier, the same, or more difficult to find work in the past 
year. 
Table 4.13: Has It Been Easier Or More Difficult To Find A Job In The Last 12 Months? 
Number of Men Number of Women   
Have DL No DL Have DL  No DL 
Easier 9 2 7 2 
Same 32 18 34 7 
More Difficult 70 49 37 13 
Two hundred seventy four people were asked specifically about the number of hours a 
week that they worked during the previous year, as compared to earlier.  It appears that 
people with driver’s licenses fared slightly better than those without, but not by much, as 
is shown in Table 4.14, below.   
Table 4.14: Have You Have Worked Fewer Hours A Week In The Last 12 Months Than Previous 
Years? 
Number of Men Number of Women   
Have DL No DL Have DL  No DL 
More Hours 5 2 6 0 
Same 37 23 31 4 
Fewer Hours 70 42 39 15 
When asked about wages, it appears that driver’s license holders fared relatively better in 
the last year, as compared with earlier years, than people without driver’s licenses, as 
shown in Table 4.15. 
Table 4.15: “Have You Earned Less Money Per Hour In The Past 12 Months Than In Previous 
Years?” 
Number of Men Number of Women   
Have DL No DL Have DL No DL 
More 12 5 7 0 
Same 45 20 38 8 
Less 55 42 31 11 
4.2.5.4 Consumption Behavior 
Of a total of 243 people who answered the question "Do you think the new rules that ask 
for a different ID to obtain a driver’s license have affected your shopping?", 57% said 
no, as seen in Figure 4.25.  
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Figure 4.25: Have You Changed Your Shopping Habbits? 
Of the 104 people who felt that their purchases have been affected by the change in the 
law, 95 offered more details on the things they could not buy or problems they faced in 
making purchases, presented in Table 4.16.  Most reported problems making purchases in 
general, perhaps related to a lack of transportation.  Some respondents mentioned that 
when they ask for a ride to go shopping, they buy more than usual, to avoid constantly 
asking for a ride.  As one person said, "There are people who go shopping every fifteen 
days, so they do not to ask for rides very often”. 
Several mentioned an inability to buy a house, car, cell phone, cigarettes or alcohol, as 
well as difficulty getting credit, which are probably less related to a lack of transportation 
and more connected to a lack of identification.  
Table 4.16: Problems Faced While Making Purchases 
Problem Men Women 
Do not make purchases in general 36 27 
Cannot buy a house or a car 17 5 
Cannot buy on credit 4 1 
Cannot buy cigarettes or alcohol 2 1 
Cannot buy appliances 1 1 
Cannot get invoices 1  
Cannot buy a phone 1  
People who aren’t directly affected have the perception that others are unable to buy cars, 
or are losing their cars. 
"People have lost cars that they purchased because they have no driver’s license, and 
they have been pulled over and they also have been arrested.  At the time they want to get 
back their cars, as they are not in their own names and they have no driver’s license, 
they lose them automatically." 
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 As well as difficulties making purchases, we thought it might be possible that people 
would purchase more of some consumer goods, perhaps compensating for an inability to 
go out as frequently.  Of the 55 people that we asked this question, 6 men indicated that 
they had made purchases they might not have made if they had a driver’s license.  These 
included a television, a radio, a computer and appliances, as well as more groceries. 
4.2.6 Impact on Daily Life due to ID issues 
Of course, in the U.S., a driver’s license is also the primary form of identification as well as the 
proof of having passed the driving exam.  As a form of identification the driver’s license is 
commonly used for: 
 opening bank, utility or video store accounts; 
 obtaining insurance, a mortgage, loan or credit card; 
 enrolling children in school;  
 joining a local library;  
 flying domestically; and  
 as proof of age, for the purchase of alcohol or cigarettes. 
People who lack legal status in the U.S. may hold other forms of identification, though some are 
reported to abandon their identifying documents while crossing the border from Mexico.  
Mexican nationals, estimated to be the vast majority of undocumented people in Oregon, may 
obtain a passport or the matricula consular from the Mexican Consulate.  The Mexican 
government has promoted the matricula consular quite actively in the past 10 years.   
As was reported in Chapter 2: 
Vicente Fox assumed the Presidency of Mexico in 2000, committed to improving the 
situation of undocumented Mexicans in the U.S. by pushing for immigration reform.  An 
interim step, according to his Foreign Minister, Jorge Castañeda (2007, p. 143) was 
“overhauling the Mexican Consular Identification Card, and handing it out on a massive 
scale to Mexican nationals in the United States.”  This effort was stepped up to provide 
undocumented Mexicans some form of identification in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks. 
The process for obtaining a matricula consular was made more stringent, and the card 
itself is now very difficult to forge, according to staff in the Mexican Consulate in 
Portland. Currently, in order to obtain a matricula consular, an applicant must: (1) 
present proof of Mexican identity with a supporting document such as a birth certificate, 
a certificate of Mexican Nationality, etc.; (2) present proof of his/her identity with 
documents issued by Mexican or US authorities (e.g., passport, electoral ID, expired 
matricula consular, etc.); (3) present proof of residence within the consular district (e.g., 
water bill with applicant’s name and address); and (4) pay an issuance fee of $26. Each 
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 matricula consular includes an ID number and the name, address in Mexico, and 
photograph. All matriculas consulares are issued for a period of 5 years.  
Of the 351 people answering the question, “Do you have ID?,” only sixty percent indicated that 
they did, including 58 percent of the men and 64 percent of the women.   It is not entirely clear 
from the responses whether or not people understood the question to include other forms of 
identification as well as U.S. driver’s licenses or not.   
Likewise, we do not appear to have been able to gather much systematic information about the 
use of the Oregon ID card, as opposed to the Oregon Driver’s License, resulting perhaps from a 
lack of familiarity with the Oregon ID card on the part of our Mexican interviewing team, as 
well as study respondents.  In follow-up interviewing on this point, we were told that by 
immigrants who have held the ID card that they use it much as they imagine an American who 
doesn’t drive would use it:  to enter a bar, to open a bank account, to rent an apartment, to apply 
for a job, or to buy something in Washington and avoid paying taxes.  Several people mentioned 
that they thought it was better than nothing when they drove, and one reported that he showed it 
to a police officer after being pulled over, and was let off with a warning.   
As shown in Table 4.17 below, the biggest group of interviewees uses U.S. ID as their principal 
identification for routine activities in Oregon. The matricula consular is also an important proof 
of identity. 
Table 4.17. Activities Performed Using Different Identifications, Number Of People 
Activity Driver’
s license 
Matricula Consular Name and 
address 
Name 
and SSN 
Chec
k 
Car 
insurance 
Open a bank account 119 44 2 4 0 0 
Enroll children in 
school  
66 12 3 1 1 0 
Get medical attention  86 15 5 5 1 1 
State stamps* 32 4 0 0 1 0 
State aid* 21 5 0 1 0 0 
State aid for children*  10 2 0 1 0 0 
Other social service*  7 0 0 0 0 0 
Hire electricity or gas 
in the house 
79 13 3 1 0 0 
Use the library 66 8 1 0 0 0 
Get a credit card 18 2 0 0 0 0 
Buy alcohol 25 2 0 0 0 0 
Buy cigarettes 16 0 0 0 0 0 
Other  20 2 0 0 0 0 
*In the case of people who have legal status in the U.S. and are eligible, or whose children or other family members 
have legal status and are eligible. 
 
Of 359 people who answered to the question “Do you have a Matricula Consular?", 67% (132 
men and 109 women) indicated that they did, as seen in Figure 4.26. 
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Figure 4.26: Do You Have a Matricula Consular? 
Far fewer people, 39% of 350 respondents (73 men and 65 women) said that they hold a 
Mexican passport, as shown in Figure 4.27.  Thirty percent of the 359 Mexicans interviewed 
reported that they have both a matricula consular and a Mexican passport.  Both documents can 
be obtained at the Mexican Consulate in Portland, with proper supporting material.  Passports are 
more expensive than matriculas consulares, but are now required for travel between the U.S. and 
Mexico.   
When probed further about the reasons for obtaining the matricula consular, people indicated 
that the need for a primary form of identification was by far the most important motive.  Both 
identification and potential travel to Mexico were important for people who hold a Mexican 
passport.  The same concerns emerge from questions about particular occasions when each form 
of ID has been particularly useful, as well as the abilities to open bank accounts, cash checks and 
obtain a U.S. driver’s license. 
 
Figure 4.27: Do You Have a Mexican Passport? 
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 Interviewees indicated a strong preference for any form of ID issued by a U.S. government 
agency, over either the matricula consular or a Mexican passport, as shown in Figure 4.28.  The 
U.S. ID is easier to use in their daily lives, is more widely accepted, and is much less likely to 
expose them to ill treatment by people who assume that they are undocumented.  A significant 
number of respondents also indicated that they did not have time to obtain the matricula 
consular or a Mexican passport, or that they did not have the documentation required.  A few 
reported the perception that the staff of the Mexican consulate discriminates against indigenous 
Mexicans attempting to obtain a matricula consular.  
 
Figure 4.28: Why Has Your Matricula Consular or Passport Not Been Useful? 
4.3 CONCLUSIONS 
Although we were able to work with a Mexican research team questioning 390 people in Spanish 
in interviews lasting from 20 to 75 minutes, we cannot be sure that the experiences reported are 
representative of the entire population of Spanish-speaking migrants residing in Oregon.  To be 
representative in the statistical sense would require that interviewees be selected by a random 
process from the entire population; that is clearly impossible for a group that is somewhat hidden 
as are people without legal status.  Not only might people wish to avoid being noticed, many of 
lack a permanent address and telephone. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the information we have gathered provides substantial insight into 
the experiences and reactions of the Latino immigrant population to the implementation of SB 
1080 as of the summer of 2009.  Although approximately two-thirds of the people with whom 
we spoke held driver’s licenses and identification cards, we heard a great deal of fear expressed 
about: 
 the reasons for the change in legislation; 
 the way in which the new policy is being enforced;, and 
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  the likely impact on individuals and families of losing the ability to drive legally and 
engage in other activities that require U.S. identification. 
Clearly, people are driving less and engaging in fewer activities. They are also finding it 
increasingly necessary to provide transportation for family members and friends who might 
otherwise be more independent.  They are living with greater uncertainty about their ability to 
negotiate providing for themselves and others in the future. A large proportion of interviewees 
expressed the opinion that the policy is discriminatory, and driven by the desire to reduce the 
number of Latinos and immigrants in Oregon. 
Some migrants are finding ways to work around the new restrictions on Oregon driver’s licenses 
and ID cards.  Some are strategizing to acquire a driver’s license from the state of Washington, 
some are obtaining an International Driver’s License (despite its limited value), and others are 
driving without a license and/or car insurance.  Many respondents expressed the concern that the 
roads are less safe as a result. 
At this point it is hard to distinguish the impact of SB 1080 from the effects of the deep and 
ongoing recession.  It does appear that the inability to obtain a driver’s license is having some 
limiting effect on labor market outcomes, as well as people’s purchases, whether due to the need 
for U.S. identification or the lack of the convenience of a car.  
Further, many people still have a valid license or ID card who will not be able to renew them in 
the future.  It’s likely that the impact of SB 1080 will grow over time, and emerge more clearly 
as the economy begins to recover. 
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 5.0 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This report presents estimates of the economic impacts of the implementation of SB 1080, based 
upon available statistical evidence and an original economic model developed for this analysis.  
Our report is organized into the following sections: 
Portrait of the Undocumented Workforce:  This section defines the “population of interest,” 
an approximation of Oregon’s undocumented workforce based upon characteristics available via 
the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS) publicly available micro data.  Using 
ACS data for 2005-7, 2008, and 2009, this section estimates the size and summarizes the 
characteristics of the undocumented population– including occupations and industries in which 
they represent a significant share of the labor force. 
Evidence of Economics Impacts to Date:  Continuing analysis of data from the ACS, we 
investigate whether the implementation of SB 1080 appears to have reduced the size of the 
undocumented workforce through the end of 2009. 
Analytical Approach and Assumptions:  This section describes our approach to modeling the 
future impact of SB 1080, once existing (pre-2008) driver’s licenses have expired and assuming 
that the economy returns to full employment.   
Results and Discussion:  We describe our baseline scenario along with five additional scenarios 
designed to show the effects of varying our assumptions over a wide, but plausible, range of 
alternatives.  For each scenario, we describe our model’s results in terms of job losses, 
reductions in total output and income, changes in the employment of documented workers, and 
effects on wages.   
Qualitative Impacts:  In this section, we discuss the hard-to-quantify potential impact of SB 
1080 on the makeup of the undocumented workforce.   
Conclusion:  The concluding section summarizes our results. 
5.2 PORTRAIT OF THE POPULATION OF INTEREST 
Oregon’s immigrant population is immensely diverse – indeed, it is literally global.  However, as 
discussed elsewhere in this study, the state’s undocumented immigrant population is 
predominately (95% or more) Mexican-born, and therefore we focus exclusively on the 
undocumented Mexican-born population.  It should be borne in mind that our estimates exclude 
impacts on the non-Mexican born and thus will tend to err on the side of conservatism.   
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 In Chapter 4, we presented results of an original survey of Latino migrants, carried out during 
the summer of 2009.  The survey design offered the opportunity to obtain rich, detailed “on-the-
ground” observations of the Oregon’s Latino migrant community.  However, great care must be 
taken when generalizing the results of such a survey to the population as a whole.  To 
complement the survey results, this section provides a quantitative portrait of the population of 
interest, derived from the American Community Survey (ACS), an annual survey performed by 
the U.S. Census Bureau.  Some aspects of this portrait update results presented in Chapter 3, to 
incorporate newly available data and to focus particularly on the labor force. 
To develop this portrait, we make use of data available from the Integrated Public Use Microdata 
Series (IPUMS) database at the University of Minnesota (Ruggles et al 2010).  Microdata 
provide a statistical sampling of individual survey responses – anonymously, of course – making 
it possible for analysts to select and tabulate data as needed for the specific purpose at hand.  To 
provide a view of recent trends (and to reduce the influence of sampling artifacts) we analyze 
data from three separate IPUMS samples:  the 2005-7 sample, the 2008 sample and the 2009 
sample.  Patterns in the data are quite similar across the different years’ samples, giving us 
reasonable confidence that our results are not unduly influenced by idiosyncrasies of any one 
year’s survey methodology. 
It should be borne in mind that the data under discussion here are self-reported responses to a 
government survey.  Under-reporting is a known issue with such data, particularly with regard to 
undocumented immigrant groups.  The data reported in this section are not adjusted for 
undercounting.  When we turn to modeling the impact of SB 1080, we apply a blanket “under-
count correction factor” calibrated to align the scale of the undocumented workforce more 
closely with estimates appearing in Jaeger (2008) and Passel and Cohn (2011). 
With these caveats in mind, we turn to our definition of the population of interest. As discussed 
above, we confine our discussion to the Mexican-born population.  Since we are primarily 
interested in labor supply, we further restrict the population of interest to potential labor force 
participants – individuals aged sixteen and over.  Finally, since we are concerned with the 
undocumented population, we exclude those born to American parents and naturalized citizens.  
Unfortunately, Census data do not distinguish between non-citizen legal residents and the 
undocumented, so our statistics include both authorized and unauthorized immigrants. 
Table 5.1 shows the population (age 16 and over), workforce, and employment for the 
population of interest and the State of Oregon as a whole, by sex, for each of the IPUMS 
samples.  Over the entire period, the Mexican-born population has consistently made up 
approximately 5% of Oregon’s labor force and 5% of its employment1.  In 2005-7, the Mexican-
born totaled about 116,000 out of Oregon’s 2.8 million residents (age 16 and over), and held 
about 83,000 of Oregon’s 1.8 million jobs. 
Mexican-born men have higher labor force participation than average (89% - 91%, versus 73% - 
75%), while female labor force participation is close to comparable to the statewide average 
                                                 
1  As mentioned above, these figures are unadjusted for under-reporting.  The actual share is likely somewhat 
higher, perhaps in the neighborhood of six percent.  See the Results section, below, for a discussion of alternative 
correction factors. 
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 (57% - 61%, versus 60%-62%).  Prior to 2009, the official unemployment rate for Mexican-born 
men was lower than the overall male unemployment rate, at 5% as compared with 7%, but in 
2009 this pattern shifted, as the unemployment rate for Mexican-born men rose to 14%, 
compared with 13% for all Oregonian men.  The unemployment rate for Mexican-born women 
has consistently been three to four points higher than the corresponding rate for all Oregon 
women, though the gap narrowed to two points in 2009.  
Table 5.1: Population, Workforce, and Employment 
  Male   Female   Total 
 2005-7 2008 2009  2005-7 2008 2009  2005-7 2008 2009 
Mexican Born Non-Citizen Population          
            
Total Population 78,204 77,484 78,066  52,008 47,607 53,367  130,302 125,181 132,323 
Adult Population 70,054 70,350 72,666  45,878 43,509 49,138  115,932 113,859 122,004 
Work Force 62,414 64,198 64,265  26,036 26,388 29,137  88,450 90,586 93,402 
Employment 59,222 61,037 55,539  23,534 23,477 25,727  82,756 84,514 81,263 
            
LF Participation 89% 91% 88%  57% 61% 59%  76% 80% 77% 
Unemployment 5% 5% 14%  10% 11% 12%  6% 7% 13% 
                        
            
All Oregon Population           
            
Total Population 
1,821,80
2 
1,884,73
9 
1,896,62
0  
1,857,69
6 
1,905,32
1 
1,929,03
7  
3,689,49
8 
3,790,06
0 
3,825,65
7 
Adult Population 
1,375,49
8 
1,417,70
3 
1,424,73
9  
1,445,14
7 
1,483,85
9 
1,506,14
4  
2,820,64
5 
2,901,56
2 
2,930,88
3 
Work Force 
1,026,92
9 
1,054,99
1 
1,037,61
7  870,195 913,576 930,614  
1,898,12
4 
1,968,56
7 
1,968,23
1 
Employment 956,055 983,735 902,996  812,348 853,168 841,310  
1,768,40
3 
1,836,90
3 
1,744,30
6 
            
LF Participation 75% 71% 73%  60% 62% 62%  67% 68% 67% 
Unemployment 7% 7% 10%  7% 7% 10%  7% 7% 11% 
                        
            
Mexican Born Non-Citizen Workforce Share      5% 5% 5% 
Mexican Born Non-Citizen Employment Share           5% 5% 5% 
Adult Population: Age 16 and up          
Source: IPUMS/ACS 
Table 5.2 shows the age distribution of Mexican-born adults in Oregon, again by sex and for all 
three IPUMS samples.  Notably, the population of interest is heavily concentrated in the prime 
working years, ages 25-54.  This group accounts for three-quarters of the Mexican-born, 
compared with a statewide average of just over half.  At the same time, only 2% - 3% of the 
population of interest is age 65 or older, compared with 16% - 17% of all Oregonians.  Teens, 
aged 16 – 19, make up something close to 6% of both Mexican-born and the Oregon population 
as a whole. 
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 Table 5.2: Population by Age Group 
Age Group   Male   Female   Total 
  2005-7 2008 2009  2005-7 2008 2009  2005-7 2008 2009 
             
Mexican Born Non-Citizen Population         
             
Age 16-19  6% 4% 6%  5% 5% 9%  5% 5% 7% 
Age 20-24  14% 10% 12%  11% 12% 11%  13% 11% 12% 
Age 25-54  74% 78% 72%  78% 73% 74%  76% 76% 73% 
Age 55-65  4% 5% 7%  3% 9% 4%  4% 7% 6% 
Age 65+  2% 2% 3%  3% 1% 2%  2% 2% 3% 
             
Total  100% 100% 100%  100% 100% 100%  100% 100% 100% 
                          
             
All Oregon Population          
             
Age 16-19  7% 7% 7%  6% 6% 7%  7% 6% 7% 
Age 20-24  9% 8% 9%  8% 8% 8%  8% 8% 9% 
Age 25-54  55% 55% 53%  53% 52% 51%  54% 53% 52% 
Age 55-65  15% 15% 16%  15% 16% 16%  15% 16% 16% 
Age 65+  15% 15% 15%  18% 18% 18%  16% 17% 17% 
             
Total  100% 100% 100%  100% 100% 100%  100% 100% 100% 
                          
Source: IPUMS/ACS 
Table 5.3 shows the distribution of marital status, by age, of Oregon’s Mexican-born population 
and the population as a whole.  Overall, the rate of marriage in the population of interest is 
similar to--if slightly higher than-- that of the general population, but the likelihood of reporting 
a status of “Married, Spouse Absent” is higher among the Mexican-born, at 6% - 9%, as 
compared with 2%.  This may represent individuals working in the United States while their 
families remain in their countries of origin.  Rates of divorce or separation are lower than the 
Oregon average overall at 7% - 11% versus 14% - 15%, and this pattern holds true for all age 
groups over 24.  The higher proportion of widows and widowers in the general Oregon 
population, as compared with the Mexican-born, at 6% versus 1% - 2%, appears to be an artifact 
of the different age distributions noted in Table 5.2. 
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 Table 5.3: Marital Status 
Age   Marital Status   Mexican Born Non-Citizens   All Oregon 
    2005-7 2008 2009  2005-7 2008 2009 
           
Age 16+  Married, SP  45% 51% 48%  50% 50% 50% 
  Married, SA  9% 9% 6%  2% 2% 2% 
  Never Married  35% 32% 34%  27% 28% 28% 
  Div/Sep  9% 7% 11%  15% 15% 14% 
  Widowed  2% 2% 1%  6% 6% 6% 
  All Statuses  100% 100% 100%  100% 100% 100% 
                      
           
Age 16-19  Married, SP  2% 3% 2%  1% 1% 1% 
  Married, SA  0% 0% 0%  1% 0% 0% 
  Never Married  98% 97% 98%  99% 99% 99% 
  Div/Sep  0% 0% 0%  0% 0% 0% 
  Widowed  0% 0% 0%  0% 0% 0% 
  All Statuses  100% 100% 100%  100% 100% 100% 
           
Age 20-24  Married, SP  22% 27% 28%  15% 12% 10% 
  Married, SA  6% 6% 4%  2% 1% 1% 
  Never Married  68% 64% 63%  81% 85% 85% 
  Div/Sep  3% 2% 5%  2% 2% 3% 
  Widowed  0% 0% 0%  0% 0% 0% 
  All Statuses  100% 100% 100%  100% 100% 100% 
           
           
Age 25-54  Married, SP  52% 57% 54%  57% 55% 56% 
  Married, SA  9% 9% 7%  2% 2% 2% 
  Never Married  27% 26% 26%  23% 24% 25% 
  Div/Sep  11% 7% 13%  17% 17% 16% 
  Widowed  1% 1% 0%  1% 1% 1% 
  All Statuses  100% 100% 100%  100% 100% 100% 
           
Age 55-64  Married, SP  58% 47% 74%  65% 65% 67% 
  Married, SA  17% 18% 8%  2% 2% 2% 
  Never Married  5% 13% 4%  6% 7% 7% 
  Div/Sep  11% 19% 9%  22% 22% 20% 
  Widowed  9% 3% 5%  5% 5% 4% 
  All Statuses  100% 100% 100%  100% 100% 100% 
           
Age 64+  Married, SP  33% 72% 14%  54% 54% 54% 
  Married, SA  27% 11% 17%  2% 2% 2% 
  Never Married  5% 0% 20%  3% 3% 3% 
  Div/Sep  10% 0% 12%  13% 13% 14% 
  Widowed  25% 16% 37%  28% 28% 26% 
  All Statuses  100% 100% 100%  100% 100% 100% 
                      
           
SP: Spouse Present         
SA: Spouse Absent         
                      
Source: IPUMS/ACS 
Turning to a characteristic of great importance for the subject of the present analysis, Table 5.4 
shows the distribution of the primary mode of transportation to work.  In this regard, the 
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 population of interest is strikingly similar to Oregonians in general.  Specifically, 81% - 82% 
rely on automobiles, trucks, vans or motorcycles to reach their workplace.  There are minor 
differences--the Mexican-born are slightly more likely to use public transportation and slightly 
less likely to walk or bicycle to work--but, on this dimension, the population of interest is 
essentially indistinguishable from Oregonians as a whole.  What cannot be discerned from the 
available data is whether there are differences in who does the driving – i.e. the degree to which 
the population of interest is more likely to rely on work-crew transportation arrangements or 
other alternatives that may not require the worker him- or herself to be a licensed driver.  (For 
more detail on driving and ride-sharing arrangements, see the results of the interview study, 
Chapter 3.)  What does appear clearly is that automotive transportation plays as large a role in 
the work-lives of the population of interest as it does for all Oregonians.  It seems reasonable to 
infer that prohibiting the issuance of driver’s licenses to the undocumented will complicate the 
employment situation and daily lives of the population of interest to some degree. 
Table 5.4: Mode of Transportation to Work 
Mode of Transportation   Mexican Born Non-Citizens   All Oregon 
  2005-7 2008 2009 2005-7 2008 2009 
    
Auto, Truck, Van or Motorcycle 82% 81% 81%  82% 81% 81% 
Public Transportation  4% 8% 5%  4% 4% 4% 
Bycycle or Walked  5% 4% 4%  5% 6% 6% 
Worked At Home  5% 2% 6%  5% 6% 6% 
Other or N/A  4% 5% 4%  4% 3% 3% 
Total  100% 100% 100%  100% 100% 100% 
                  
Public Transportation includes bus, streetcar, subway or elevated train, railroad train, and ferryboat. 
Source: IPUMS/ACS 
Table 5.5, however, reveals that the distribution of occupations among the Mexican-born differs 
substantially from that observed in the Oregon economy as a whole.  The population of interest 
is highly concentrated in a few occupational categories, and, within those categories, constitutes 
a substantial fraction of total employment.  In 2005-72, the Mexican-born population contributed 
5% to Oregon’s total employment, but held 49% of jobs in the Farming, Fishing & Forestry 
occupational category, 18% of Building Maintenance and Grounds-Keeping jobs, 11% of Food 
Preparation and Serving jobs, and 10% of Construction and Extraction jobs. 
                                                 
2  We use the 2005-7 figures as the starting point for our impact modeling because it give us a benchmark for the 
structure of the Oregon economy when it is not in the midst of a recession.   
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 Table 5.5: Distribution By Occupation (2005-7) 
           
SOC Occupational Category  Employment 
   MBNC Total Share 
      
11 Management  1,626 166,538 1% 
13 Business & Finance  129 69,966 0% 
15 Computer & Mathematics  146 38,699 0% 
17 Architecture & Engineering  254 37,873 1% 
19 Sciences  0 18,489 0% 
21 Social Services  261 30,554 1% 
23 Legal  49 18,461 0% 
25 Education  233 91,855 0% 
27 Arts & Entertainment  215 38,224 1% 
29 Healthcare Practice  141 76,571 0% 
31 Healthcare Support  293 34,323 1% 
33 Protective Service  115 29,710 0% 
35 Food Preperation & Serving  10,931 96,351 11% 
37 Building Maintenance & Grounds  12,299 66,879 18% 
39 Personal Care  1,217 66,553 2% 
41 Sales  3,048 201,337 2% 
43 Office & Administration  3,235 251,920 1% 
45 Farming, Fishing & Forestry  17,954 36,917 49% 
47 Construction & Extraction  10,309 107,506 10% 
49 Installation, Maint & Repair  1,473 56,586 3% 
51 Production  11,219 123,574 9% 
53 Transport  7,609 107,946 7% 
98 Military  0 1,571 0% 
      
 Total  82,756 1,768,403 5% 
            
      
MBNC: Mexical Born Non-Citizen     
Share: MBNC employment as percentage of Total in each occupation  
            
Source: IPUMS/ACS 
The Mexican-born population is also concentrated in certain industries.  As Table 5.6 shows, 
almost 80% of the employed population of interest works in just twenty industries, defined at the 
level of 3-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code.  In our 
benchmark period, 2005-7, 45% of the employment in Crop Production, 43% of the employment 
in Agriculture Support, and 20% of the employment in Food Manufacturing (e.g. canneries) was 
held by Oregon’s Mexican-born population. Mexican immigrants also accounted for 9% of the 
employment in the Accommodation industry (i.e. hotels and motels) as well as 12% of 
employment in Food Service (i.e. restaurants and other dining establishments). 
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 Table 5.6: Distribution by Industry (2005-7) 
           
NAICS3 Industry  Employment 
   MBNC Total Share 
      
111 Crop Production  12,610 27,866 45% 
112 Animal Production  1,876 10,461 18% 
115 Agricultural Support  3,400 7,928 43% 
230 Construction  10,544 135,825 8% 
311 Food Manufacturing  4,135 20,930 20% 
312 Beverage & Tobacco Manufacturing  213 2,243 9% 
313 Textile Mills  83 354 23% 
314 Textile Product Mills  198 1,293 15% 
315 Apparel Manufacturing  180 2,298 8% 
321 Wood Product Manufacturing  3,074 33,076 9% 
326 Plastics & Rubber  455 5,131 9% 
327 Non-Metalic Mineral Manufacturing  550 6,096 9% 
335 Electrical Equipment & Appliances  209 2,623 8% 
337 Furnature & Related  1,487 8,817 17% 
339 Misc Manufacturing  1,220 15,954 8% 
424 Wholesale Non-Durable Goods  3,267 28,275 12% 
493 Warehousing & Storage  285 3,221 9% 
561 Admin & Support Services  7,850 65,988 12% 
721 Accomodation  1,735 19,963 9% 
722 Food Service  12,159 102,575 12% 
      
Subtotal  65,530 500,917 13% 
      
 Other Industries  17,226 1,267,486 1% 
      
Total, All Industries  82,756 1,768,403 5% 
            
      
MBNC: Mexical Born Non-Citizen     
Share: MBNC employment as percentage of Total in each occupation  
            
Source: IPUMS/ACS 
This concentration, both by occupation and by industry, should be kept in mind when evaluating 
the economic impact of reducing the undocumented workforce.  While the population of interest 
provides only 5% of the total workforce in Oregon, it constitutes a much higher share in 
particular industries and occupations.  Any impacts due to SB 1080 will not be felt equally 
across the state’s economy.  Certain industries, and employers hiring for certain occupations, 
will shoulder a disproportionate share of the costs.  
5.3 EVIDENCE OF ECONOMIC IMPACTS TO DATE 
An important question to address is whether the implementation of SB 1080 has already had a 
measurable economic impact.  Elsewhere in this report, results of interviews with both workers 
and employers are discussed, leading to the general conclusion that the impacts so far have been 
chiefly personal and social, with certain businesses facing the loss of key personnel but not 
widespread labor shortages.  This section complements the survey results with quantitative data 
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 drawn from the IPUMS/ACS micro data.  Based on that data, we find no indication of significant 
economic impacts from SB 1080 through 2009, the latest year for which data are available.   
Since we assume that the primary economic impact of SB 1080 will occur by way of a reduction 
in the size of the undocumented workforce, we focus on two key indicators of this effect, 
whether or not the Mexican-born population and workforce appear to have diminished in 
number, and whether or not there are signs of a tightening labor market for the undocumented, 
such as lower unemployment rates.  
As was shown in Table 5.1, the adult population of interest in Oregon has actually grown since 
2005-7, from about 116,000 to 122,000 in 2009, and the corresponding workforce has increased 
from about 88,000 to 93,000.  At the same time, the unemployment rate among the population of 
interest has risen from 6% in 2005-7 to 13% in 2009.  Based on the ACS data, we would 
estimate that there were approximately 12,000 Mexican-born residents of Oregon seeking 
employment who were unable to find it, due to the magnitude of the recession that continues to 
grip the state and the nation. 
Therefore, we find no indication in the available statistical evidence that SB 1080 has yet 
reduced the undocumented workforce or led to a tightened labor market for the undocumented. 
At the same time, there is evidence that SB 1080, along with the executive order that preceded it,  
has had a substantial impact on the number of drivers licenses issued to Spanish speakers – many 
of whom are likely to be members of the population of interest. 
Figure 5.1 below shows the trend in the number of individuals passing the Spanish-language 
version of the General Knowledge test required for an Oregon driver’s license.  If we ignore the 
“spike” in December, 2007 and January, 2008 – presumably created by people concerned to 
evade the looming restrictions of SB 1080 – the count averaged 1,171 per month in 2007 and 
106 per month in 2008 and 2009, a decrease of about 90%. 
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Figure 5.1: Number Passing General Knowledge Test 
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 During the three-year period from 2007 through 2009, 18,751 individuals passed the Spanish-
language test.  Had comparable numbers of people continued to take the test as did prior to 
December 2007 average, the number of individuals passing the Spanish-language test would 
instead have been 42,156.  Ignoring other factors that might prevent the issuance of a driver’s 
license – such as failure to pass the behind-the-wheel drive test – these figures suggest that the 
policy change in February 2008 prevented the issuance of about 23,000 licenses over the 
following 23 months.   
From the available data, it is difficult to determine what fraction of these “missing licenses” 
might represent individuals who remained in Oregon, regardless, and what fraction may have 
returned to other states, such as California, with stricter licensing requirements.  These results do 
suggest that, absent SB 1080, the undocumented workforce in Oregon might have grown more 
than it has.  However, the fact remains that the undocumented workforce is approximately as 
large as it has ever been, and the unemployment rate among the population of interest suggests 
that, so far, no labor shortage has arisen.  Therefore, we conclude that the direct economic 
impacts of SB 1080 have yet to materialize.  
5.4 ANALYTICAL APPROACH & ASSUMPTIONS 
5.4.1 Basic Framework 
The key assumption underlying our analysis is that, in the long run, the implementation of SB 
1080 will have the effect of reducing the size of the undocumented workforce in the state, and 
that this “labor supply shock” will be the primary driver of the economic impacts.  We employ a 
simplified labor supply-and-demand framework to estimate the likely responses of employers 
and the remaining Oregon labor force to this reduction in the labor force and then the 
consequences for employment, wages and output in the state.   
The fundamental idea underlying this approach can be illustrated with a classic supply-and-
demand “scissor diagram” (see below).  The diagram shows the relationship between wages, the 
supply of labor (i.e. the willingness of individuals to participate in the workforce and the number 
of hours they are willing to work), and the demand for labor (i.e. the willingness of employers to 
hire workers and offer more hours of work).  The supply curve slopes upward, meaning that 
higher wages encourage more individuals to enter or remain in the labor force (e.g. by delaying 
retirement or choosing to work instead of pursuing additional education).  The demand curve 
slopes downward, meaning that higher wages cause employers to hire fewer workers or reduce 
the hours of work offered.  The point at which the curves cross represents the market-clearing 
wage and quantity of employment – that is, the wage rate and employment level at which the 
supply and demand for labor are equal.  Under normal macroeconomic conditions – i.e. when the 
economy is not in a recession – economists expect actual wages and employment to be close to 
their market-clearing levels.   And when external conditions change in a way that affects the 
market-clearing wage and employment, such as a reduction in the labor force due to legal 
changes such as SB 1080, economists expect actual wages and employment numbers to adapt to 
new conditions. 
86 
 Wage
Employment
Supply
Demand
E2
W2
W1
E1
W3
 
Figure 5.2:  The Impact of Reduced Labor Supply on Wages and Employment 
The process of adaptation can be illustrated graphically, as in Figure 5.2, above.  Before the 
implementation of SB 1080 and the recession, E1 hours of work were performed in a year, for a 
wage of W1 per hour. When the size of the workforce is reduced due to external forces – such as 
the implementation of SB 1080 – the labor supply curve “shifts” to the left. In order to obtain E1 
hours of work, Oregon employers would have to offer W3 an hour. However, employers do not 
find it worthwhile to use E1 hours of labor at that price, and the market finds its way to a 
mutually satisfactory equilibrium under the new conditions, at E2 and W2.  In other words, once 
the market has adjusted to the decline in the labor force, the market-clearing wage has risen and 
the market-clearing quantity of employment has fallen.   
Real-world labor markets are obviously considerably more complex than this sketch.  The 
overall labor market in Oregon is comprised of many smaller, occupation- and location-specific 
labor markets, which affect each other and “add up” to the abstraction we can call the state labor 
market.  However, the principles driving the basic supply-and-demand, single labor market 
model apply, and provide a coherent framework for organizing our thinking, evidence, and the 
assumptions necessary to produce a meaningful estimate of the likely outcome of significant 
labor market changes.   
To move beyond theory to obtain quantitative estimates from a model of this type, we need to 
answer several questions:  How much would SB 1080, implemented in a near full-employment 
economy, reduce the labor force and shift the labor supply curve to the left?  How would 
employers respond to rising wages, to what degree would they reduce the number of workers 
they want to hire?  And finally, how would potential employees react to rising wages, how many 
more hours would people be willing to work if wages were higher?   In terms of Figure 5.2, the 
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 answers to these questions tell us the shape of the labor supply and demand curves, which in 
reality are generally not the straight lines of the illustration.   
5.4.2 How Much will Labor Supply Fall?  Effect of SB 1080 on 
Undocumented Workforce 
As discussed in the Portrait Section, above, many undocumented workers in Oregon rely on 
automobile transportation for access to work and for a wide variety of family and personal tasks.  
We anticipate that the unavailability of Oregon driver’s licenses to the undocumented will 
operate to reduce the number of undocumented workers through a number of channels.  The 
obstacles and inconveniences of living in Oregon without the use of an automobile may make 
living in the state less attractive.  Some may leave as a result, and others who might otherwise 
have settled in the state may go elsewhere. Some undocumented workers may risk driving 
without licenses, which exposes them to increased risk of detection and deportation.   
This is the aspect of the analysis for which we have the least evidence.  Data is not presently 
available that would allow us to evaluate the relative importance of these channels or to 
definitively ascertain their cumulative effects.  The best we can do is to make assumptions that 
seem reasonable. 
For our baseline scenario, we assume that the full implementation of SB 1080, once pre-2008 
licenses have expired, will reduce the undocumented population – both male and female – in 
Oregon by 5%, with a corresponding reduction in the workforce.  Clearly there are large 
undocumented populations in other states, despite the fact that it is also difficult for 
undocumented migrants to obtain driver’s licenses there.  To gauge the importance of this 
assumption, we also conduct the analysis assuming that the undocumented workforce is reduced 
by 2%, and by 10%, in the Results Section, below. 
As discussed above, the reduction of the workforce, other things equal, will create upward 
pressure on wages, as employers seek to maintain earlier levels of production.  Employers can be 
expected to react to rising wages by reducing the number of employees they seek to employ, 
either because they: 
1. change their methods of work to automate or in other ways, “substitute” other inputs for 
the kind of labor that is becoming more expensive, or 
2. reduce the scale of their operation, possibly even abandoning hard-hit sectors entirely. 
In addition, the remaining labor force can also be expected to react to rising wages.  Higher 
wages elicit more interest in working.  Potential employees will be willing to work more hours 
and more days in occupations with higher wages; some may leave other occupations or enter the 
labor force if they had not been interested in working at lower wages earlier. 
These topics have been intensively studied by labor economists, providing us a great deal of 
theoretical guidance and empirical evidence on which to build our estimates of the impact of a 
decline in the labor force on wages and employment.  However, the full description of our 
methods is somewhat technical, and perhaps uninteresting to a general audience.  Our methods 
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 are fully described in Appendix A-1:  Analytical Methods; our findings are presented in the next 
section. 
5.5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results of our analysis are summarized in Table 5.7.  We present a “Baseline Case,” which 
reflects our best judgment for the values of the model parameters, along with five alternative 
scenarios that illustrate the results of varying the key parameters over the plausible range. It is 
good practice to examine the effects of varying the assumptions – i.e. to perform a “sensitivity 
analysis.”  This will show how robust the results are to assumption changes and how much 
reasonable alternative assumptions will change the result.   
Taken together, these results provide both our single best estimate of the long-term effects of SB 
1080 and a range of outcomes that might emerge given reasonable alternatives for major 
assumptions.  All of the scenarios discussed here follow the same modeling approach, outlined in 
Appendix A-1.   
Scenario 1:  Baseline Case 
Assumptions:  The Baseline Case incorporates parameter values that reflect our best judgment; 
these are generally “middle of the road” values, and we supply “high” and “low” alternatives in 
other scenarios for comparison.  The derivation of most of the model parameters has been 
described in Appendix A-1, but we will review it more briefly here.   
As mentioned above, we assume that the full implementation of SB 1080 in a state economy near 
full employment will reduce the undocumented labor force; we term this the “policy impact” in 
discussion and Table 5.7 below. In this scenario, we assume that the implementation of SB 1080 
will cause a five percent reduction in the undocumented labor force.  This is a judgmental 
estimate, based in part on the observation that while Oregon is considered by Passell and Cohn 
(2011) to have the 9th greatest share of unauthorized immigrants of the fifty states, as a 
proportion of its population, eight states with a history of more restrictive licensing policies have 
larger shares.  Among these eight states are those that also have the largest absolute numbers of 
undocumented migrants, including California and Texas, which have estimated undocumented 
populations of 2.6 million and 1.7 million respectively in 2010, as compared with Oregon’s 
estimated 160,000.  Passell and Cohn (2011) estimate that undocumented immigrants account for 
10% of Nevada’s labor force, and 9.7% of California’s, as compared with 5.3% of Oregon’s.  
Thus, for the purpose of this scenario, we assume that there will be a noticeable impact on the 
undocumented workforce, but not a wholesale exodus. 
Based on an extensive empirical literature, we are able to judge how responsive potential 
employees are to changes in wages, i.e. how much more or less they are likely to work if wages 
change.  This measure represents the slope of the labor supply curve in the area near existing 
values of wages.  Adult men are not very responsive to wage changes; they are likely to work 
regardless of the wage rate.  The measured responsiveness—called the wage elasticity of labor 
supply by economists-- of adult men in the U.S. is 0.10, meaning that adult men are likely to 
increase their work hours by 1% for every 10% that wages rise (Evers et al. 2005, Killingsworth 
1983, Pencavel 1986).  Adult women are more responsive to wage increases, because many of 
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 them have primary responsibility for young children, and weigh the value of higher wages 
against the value of providing their families childrearing and other forms of “household 
production.”  For this reason, the responsiveness of U.S. women to changes in the level of wages 
is estimated at about 0.25, which represents an average of the 0.10 of unmarried women and the 
0.40 of married women (Blau and Kahn 2007, Borjas and Katz 2007, Killingsworth and 
Heckman 1986).   
Similarly, economists have put a great deal of effort into measuring the rate at which employers 
are liable to shift away from using labor when wages rise, and make greater use of automation or 
other strategies(Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce 2010).  That 
responsiveness is called the elasticity of factor substitution, and is assumed by us to be 0.50, the 
mid-point of the 0.15 – 0.85 range described by Hamermesh (1993), the pre-eminent labor 
economist working on this topic.  We assume unit elasticity of demand for non-tradable products 
and a demand elasticity of 10.0 for tradables, meaning that in general we expect that people will 
reduce their purchases of goods that become more expensive due to higher labor costs in direct 
proportion to rising prices.  However, when those goods are exports, we except that consumers 
will be far more likely to markedly shift to other sources of the same products that are not 
experiencing the same wage increases, i.e. producers in states other than Oregon.  Finally, we 
also assume an under-representation correction factor of 18%, consistent with Warren (2009) 
and with Passel and Cohn (2011), to account for the fact that a significant portion of the 
undocumented labor force is likely not captured even in our best data, such as the American 
Community Survey, operated by the U.S. Census Bureau to provide data between the decennial 
censuses.   
Results:  This scenario results in estimated direct job losses totaling 4,224.  As expected, these 
losses fall heavily in the agricultural, manufacturing, food service & hospitality, and construction 
industries.  Employment of undocumented workers falls by 4,883, partially offset by an increase 
in employment of legal workers of 659.  Wages rise by 0.16%, but total state GDP falls by $160 
million per year, or by about 0.1%.   
Of course, the wage increases are disproportionately concentrated in a few occupations and 
industries.  Wage effects by occupation and industry are shown in Tables 8 and 9, respectively, 
for the Baseline scenario.  For example, the impact on the Grounds & Buildings Maintenance 
occupations, estimated at 1.08%, is more than six times the average 0.16% increase.  Similarly, 
the impact on the Construction industry is estimated at 0.53%, or more than three times the 
average.    
Scenarios 2 & 3:  Low Impact and High Impact 
Assumptions:  Since the 5% policy impact assumption is judgmental, we model two alternative 
assumptions.  In Scenario 2, the “Low Impact” case, we reduce the assumed policy impact from 
5% of the undocumented population to 2%, while, in Scenario 3, the “High Impact” case, we 
increase the policy impact to 10%.   
Results:  Job losses in the “Low Impact” scenario total 1,688, or about 40% of the job losses 
engendered by the baseline case.  In the “High Impact” scenario, job losses rise to 8,458, slightly 
above twice the job losses in the baseline case.  The reduction in the employment of the 
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 undocumented is – of course – exactly 40% and 200% of that generated in the baseline case, but 
increases in the employment of legal workers differ slightly from these proportions.  Effects on 
wages and state GDP are also approximately 40% and 200% of the effects in the base case.  
Thus, the economic impacts in our model are very close to linear in the impact parameter, so it is 
reasonable to generalize the results in the base case as the effect of each 5% reduction in the 
undocumented labor force.  (This also sets an extreme upper bound on the economic effects of 
SB 1080, at around twenty times the base case, which would result from the complete 
disappearance of the undocumented labor force.) 
Scenarios 4 & 5:  Low Substitutability and High Substitutability 
Assumptions: If employers can substitute other inputs for labor when wages rise, they may 
respond to a labor supply shock by changing their production processes rather than by reducing 
production.  Both courses of action reduce employment, but substitution does so without 
lowering output and total income.  The degree to which substitution is possible is captured in our 
model by the elasticity of factor substitution parameter.  In the base case, we take the elasticity 
of factor substitution to be 0.50.  In Scenarios 4 and 5, we examine the results of a lower (0.15) 
and higher (0.85) elasticity of substitution.  These correspond to elasticities of labor demand in 
industries such as agriculture which span the full range suggested by Hamermesh (1993) as the 
plausible range of elasticities for individual firms and industries. 
Results:  At the low end (i.e. assuming that there are few opportunities to substitute other inputs 
for labor), we find that wages rise somewhat more than in the base case (0.22% vs. 0.16%) and 
marginally fewer jobs are lost (4,016 vs. 4,224, a difference of 108 jobs).  But the impact on state 
GDP is 25% higher ($201.9 million vs. $160.0 million).  This reflects the fact that, in the 
absence of substitution opportunities, more firms will reduce production or go out of business 
altogether.  Still, the GDP impact remains approximately 0.1% of total state GDP, 
indistinguishable (as a percentage) from the base case.   
At the high end (i.e. assuming many opportunities to substitute other inputs for labor), we obtain 
the opposite results:  job losses are marginally increased compared with the base case (4,351 vs. 
4,224), wages increase by slightly less (0.13% vs. 0.16%), and the GDP impact is lower ($134.0 
million vs. $160.0 million) albeit still within rounding error of 0.1% of total state output. 
We conclude that the economic impacts are not particularly sensitive to the assumed elasticity of 
factor substitution.  We obtain very similar outcomes all across the plausible range of values for 
this parameter. 
Scenario 6:  Higher National and International Competition 
Assumptions:  Our baseline scenario assumes that industries that produce nationally and 
internationally tradable goods (principally agriculture and manufacturing) face strong 
competition from outside the state, and therefore have less flexibility to adjust prices when their 
costs – including labor costs –change.  We model this by assuming that demand is ten times as 
responsive to price changes in the tradables sector than in the rest of the economy (i.e. an 
elasticity of demand of 10.0, compared with other industries which are taken to face unit elastic 
demand).  However, even this value could, conceivably, be too low.  To test the sensitivity of our 
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 results to this assumption, Scenario 6 incorporates an order of magnitude increase in the assumed 
elasticity of demand of the tradables sector – that is, an elasticity of demand of 100. 
Results:  The higher elasticity of demand engenders marginally more job losses than obtained in 
the base case – 4,335 as compared with 4,224, an increase of about 3%.  However, impact on 
state GDP rises by 25% (to $200.1 million vs. $160.0 million) – though this remains within 
rounding error of 0.1% of total state GDP.  Under Scenario 6, more producers in agriculture and 
manufacturing respond to the reduced labor supply by curtailing production or exiting the market 
altogether, rather than shifting to less labor intensive (but more expensive) production processes.  
As a result, similar levels of job losses are associated with larger reductions in total output.  For 
the same reason, the rise in wages is diminished (0.13% vs. 0.16% in the base case) and the gain 
in legal employment is only 548 jobs, down from 659 in the base case. 
Discussion 
Taken together, the results obtained in our six scenarios suggest that the direct employment 
impact of SB 1080 is likely to be modest, in the range of 4,000 to 5,000 net jobs lost (out of total 
Oregon employment of approximately 1.8 million; see Table 1).  At an employment growth rate 
of 3% per year, Oregon would add about this many jobs each month.  Impact on the total output 
of the state economy – i.e. state GDP – is likely to be in the neighborhood of 0.1%.  Employment 
gains for documented workers are likely to fall within the range of an additional 500 to 800 jobs, 
and wages could be increased by between 0.1% and 0.2%. 
Our estimates are not highly sensitive to changes in assumptions regarding the elasticity of 
substitution between labor and other inputs or to changes in the assumed elasticity of demand for 
the tradable goods industries.   
Our model’s economic impact estimates are approximately linear in the “policy impact” 
parameter – i.e. the percentage by which SB 1080 is assumed to reduce the undocumented 
workforce in Oregon.  If the impact estimate is doubled (from our baseline of 5% to 10%, for 
example), the economic impacts are approximately doubled as well.  This is also the most 
difficult parameter to pin down based on empirical data.  Experience to date is consistent with a 
value of zero – so far, we observe no evidence of any net reduction in the undocumented 
population.  At the same time, we must recognize that the policy is not yet fully implemented – 
many unexpired driver’s licenses from the pre-SB 1080 era are still in existence.  Moreover, the 
Great Recession may have affected international migration patterns in ways that are not yet well 
understood; a return to more normal macroeconomic conditions could reveal changes that are 
currently swamped by recession-related effects.  It will probably be several years before 
experience and data will be able to conclusively quantify the actual influence of SB 1080 on the 
undocumented workforce. 
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 Table 5.7: Results by Scenario 
              
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Baseline 
Case 
Low 
Impact 
High 
Impact 
Low 
Subst. 
High 
Subst. 
High 
Compet. 
              
        
Assumptions        
        
Labor Supply Elasticity, Male 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Labor Labor Supply Elasticity, Female 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Elasticity of Factor Substitution 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.15 0.85 0.50 
        
Elasticity of Product Demand, Tradeable 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 100.0 
Elasticity of Product Demand, Non-
Tradeable 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
        
Policy Impact, Male -5% -2% -10% -5% -5% -5% 
Policy Impact, Female -5% -2% -10% -5% -5% -5% 
Under-Count Correction 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 
              
        
Job Losses (Direct)        
        
Agriculture -993 -395 -1,988 -972 -1,005 -1,059 
Construction -536 -216 -1,075 -499 -558 -536 
Manufacturing -860 -343 -1,717 -850 -866 -905 
Health Care -87 -35 -176 -84 -92 -87 
Administration & Support -390 -156 -781 -374 -402 -390 
Wholesale & Retail Trade -364 -147 -727 -337 -378 -364 
Food Service & Hospitality -639 -256 -1,285 -578 -680 -639 
Other Industries -355 -140 -709 -322 -370 -355 
Total -4,224 -1,688 -8,458 -4,016 -4,351 -4,335 
              
        
Other Effects (Direct)        
        
Employment Change (undocumented) -4,883 -1,953 -9,765 -4,883 -4,883 -4,883 
Employment Change (documented) 659 265 1,307 867 532 548 
        
State GDP Change ($ millions) -160.0 -64.1 -317.4 -201.9 -134.0 -200.1 
As % of State GDP -0.1% 0.0% -0.2% -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% 
        
Wage Change 0.16% 0.06% 0.33% 0.22% 0.13% 0.13% 
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 Table 5.8: Wage Changes by Occupation 
    
Occupation 
    
Wage 
Increase 
Occupatio
n Weight 
Weighte
d 
Increase 
     
Top Five Occupations by Impact    
     
45 Farming, Fishing & Forestry 1.39% 0.01 0.02% 
37 Buildings & Ground Maintenance 1.08% 0.02 0.02% 
35 Food Prep & Serving 0.73% 0.02 0.02% 
47 Construction & Extraction 0.70% 0.06 0.04% 
53 Transportation 0.33% 0.05 0.02% 
     
Other Occupations    
     
51 Production 0.23% 0.06 0.01% 
49 Installation, Maintenance & Repair 1.50% 0.03 0.01% 
39 Personal Care 0.10% 0.02 0.00% 
41 Sales 0.09% 0.12 0.01% 
43 Office & Admin 0.06% 0.11 0.01% 
21 Social Service 0.05% 0.02 0.00% 
31 Healthcare Support 0.05% 0.02 0.00% 
27 Arts & Entertnmt. 0.04% 0.03 0.00% 
11 Management & Executive 0.04% 0.16 0.01% 
33 Protective Service 0.03% 0.00 0.00% 
23 Legal 0.02% 0.00 0.00% 
25 Education 0.02% 0.05 0.00% 
15 Computer & Math 0.02% 0.06 0.00% 
13 Business & Finance 0.01% 0.08 0.00% 
17 Architecture & Engineering 0.01% 0.00 0.00% 
29 Healthcare Practice 0.01% 0.11 0.00% 
     
          
All Occupations  1.00 0.16% 
          
Based upon Baseline Scenario 
Weights are occupation shares in total wage & salary spending 
Total weights may not add to 1.00 due to rounding 
94 
 Table 5.9: Wage Changes by Industry 
    
Industry 
    
Wage 
Increase 
Industry 
Weight
Weighte
d 
Increase 
     
Top Twenty Industries by Wage Impact    
     
111 Crop Production 1.314% 0.0116 0.015% 
722 Food Service 0.703% 0.0262 0.018% 
561 Admin & Support Services 0.600% 0.0239 0.014% 
230 Construction 0.532% 0.0849 0.045% 
493 Warehousing & Storage 0.532% 0.0015 0.001% 
112 Animal Production 0.514% 0.0046 0.002% 
311 Food Manufacturing 0.508% 0.0095 0.005% 
420 Wholesale NEC 0.506% 0.0006 0.000% 
424 Wholesale Non-Durable Goods 0.487% 0.0180 0.009% 
115 Agricultural Support 0.456% 0.0033 0.002% 
721 Accomodation 0.386% 0.0067 0.003% 
313 Textile Mills 0.372% 0.0001 0.000% 
811 Repair & Maintenance 0.359% 0.0116 0.004% 
314 Textile Product Mills 0.335% 0.0004 0.000% 
312 
Beverage & Tobacco 
Manufacturing 0.279% 0.0011 0.000% 
492 Courriers & Messengers 0.275% 0.0034 0.001% 
812 Personal & Laundry Services 0.263% 
30080.000
0 0.002% 
337 Furnature & Related 0.251% 0.0044 0.001% 
444 Building Material & Garden Stores 0.244% 0.0099 0.002% 
814 Private Households 0.242% 0.0019 0.000% 
326 Plastics & Rubber 0.212% 0.0032 0.001% 
     
Other Affected Industries 0.052% 0.6877 0.036% 
     
Industries With No Measurable Effects 0.000% 0.0800 0.000% 
     
          
All Industries  1.00 0.163% 
          
Based upon Baseline Scenario 
Weights are occupation shares in total wage & salary spending 
Total weights may not add to 1.00 due to rounding 
5.6 QUALITATIVE IMPACTS 
While this analysis concentrates on quantifiable aspects of the economic impact of SB 1080, we 
would be remiss if we failed to highlight a potentially significant consequence that is not readily 
quantifiable: the possible effect of SB 1080 on the demographic composition of the 
undocumented workforce.   
As can be seen from Table 5.3, above, about one-half of the population of interest is married and 
living with a spouse.  This is similar to corresponding proportion of the Oregon population as a 
whole.  Workforce participation among the undocumented is, on average, higher than among 
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 Oregonians in general.  This suggests to us that a significant portion of the undocumented 
workforce is living a more-or-less ordinary, family- and work-oriented lifestyle embedded within 
the broader community (albeit somewhat isolated by virtue of language).  We also suspect that 
these “family-present” workers are less likely than the unattached to remit a large fraction of 
their earnings to relatives in their country of origin, and more likely to spend their incomes in the 
local Oregon economy. 
Results of our survey research strongly suggest that members of the population of interest are 
extremely concerned about the impact of SB 1080 on their ability to live “ordinary” American 
lives.  That is, SB 1080 may disproportionately affect those immigrants who are the most stable 
and family-oriented.  If the demand for the services of the undocumented continues to exist, as 
seems likely, these services may be increasingly supplied by younger males, un-attached to the 
stabilizing forces of household, spouse or children.  While the consequences are difficult to 
quantify, as a qualitative concern this potential outcome bears consideration. 
5.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the available data and the modeling approach described above, we reach the following 
conclusions regarding the economic impacts of the implementation of SB 1080: 
1. There is little evidence to date that SB 1080 has reduced the size of the undocumented 
workforce in Oregon so far, and the high unemployment rate among the undocumented 
suggests that no labor shortage has yet materialized.  While anecdotal evidence indicates 
that some employers have encountered difficulty retaining key employees as a result of 
SB 1080, we find no indication of widespread economic impact at this time. 
2. Modeling the potential impact of SB 1080 on a hypothetical full-employment economy 
structurally similar to Oregon’s during the years 2005-7, we project job losses in the 
range of 4,000 – 5,000 statewide (out of 1.8 million total jobs) along with a reduction of 
total output and income of about 0.1%.   Wages are projected to rise by between 0.1% 
and 0.2%, and documented employment is projected to rise by 500 to 800 jobs. 
3. Our baseline scenario, using “most likely” or “mid-range” assumptions, yields a loss of 
4,224 jobs, an output and income reduction of 0.1%, an increase in wages of 0.16% and 
an increase in documented employment of 659 jobs. 
4. Our impact estimates are linearly sensitive to changes in the assumed policy impact – i.e. 
to the expected percentage reduction in the undocumented workforce. 
5. In addition to the quantitative economic impacts identified above, the possibility that SB 
1080 may disproportionately impact the more stable, family-oriented segment of the 
undocumented population should not be overlooked.  
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Appendix A-1:  Analytical Methods 
 
The Reaction of Employers to Upward Pressure on Wages  
Employers will react to rising wages by hiring fewer workers, either because they reduce the 
scale of their operations or because they automate some part of their processes.  How much they 
react to wage increases is described by economists as the “wage elasticity of demand.”  In order 
to make this concept precise, they ask what the impact will be of a one percent change in the 
wage on the total amount of labor demand, whether expressed as a total number of hours or jobs. 
The statistical evidence is that labor demand tends to be fairly sensitive, or elastic, because 
employers have options for how much labor they employ, particularly over the medium and 
longer term. Employers can make adjustments in the amount of labor they employ in two ways, 
by reducing the scope of their operations or by changing their production processes in order to 
use less labor and more of other inputs.. 
Production processes that use nothing but labor are relatively rare.  Usually, a business manager 
exercises some degree of choice in the “mix” of labor, materials, land, and capital used to 
produce the firm’s products and services.  For instance, banks can employ more tellers and fewer 
ATMs, or vice versa.  Employers can also switch to less labor-intensive products and services;  if 
orchard crops require less labor than berries, and both crops can be grown in the same place, 
growers may switch to the less labor-intensive crop as wages rise.  
In general, if the price of one of the inputs rises, economists expect managers to look for ways to 
use less of that input – commonly by substituting an alternative input.  Thus, when wages rise, 
economists expect businesses to use less labor and more non-labor input (such as more expensive 
materials, more energy, and more automation).  The feasibility of substituting something else for 
labor may be a complex technical and industrial engineering question, which economists attempt 
to summarize in a single variable, called the elasticity of substitution.   
The elasticity of substitution is the percentage change in the ratio of production inputs—
expressed in terms of costs-- that results from a one percent change in the relative price of one of 
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the inputs.  For example, if a production process uses two inputs (say, labor and capital) in some 
ratio X with an elasticity of substitution of 0.5, and the wage rises 10%, the firm would use less 
labor and more capital, such that the labor-to-capital ratio X would fall by 5%.   
To keep the analysis simple, we treat all production as two-input processes, with the inputs being 
“labor” and “everything else.”  We treat each industry as a distinct production process 
characterized by a constant elasticity of substation (CES) production function.   
Hamermesh (1986, 1993), the pre-eminent American economist in the field of labor demand, 
defines the relationship between the elasticity of substitution and the constant-output own-price 
elasticity of labor demand as:   1   
, where 
 is the elasticity of substitution and s is 
the share of labor costs in total revenue.  Rearranging slightly, we obtain an expression for 
: 

   1   
Surveying estimates of   based on microeconomic data, Hamermesh (1993) finds values 
ranging from -0.15 to -0.75, with an average of -0.45.  We obtain values of  for the industries in 
our analysis from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s analysis of components of value added by 
industry, calculating  as total compensation of labor divided by gross sales (Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, 2010).  These range widely, from as little as .03 (in real estate) to as much 
as .57 (in education services).  Thus there is considerable variability in empirical estimates of 
both components of 
.  Rather than choose a single value under these circumstances, we model a 
range of plausible values, from 
  0.15 to 
  0.85, with the midpoint (
  0.50) serving as 
our baseline assumption.  Fortunately, our results are not sensitive to the choice of 
 over this 
range (see Results, above). 
The elasticities of labor demand discussed so far are so-called “constant output” elasticities.  
That is, they reflect only substitution between inputs, keeping output unchanged.  However, an 
increase in a firm’s costs that is passed on to customers would be expected to reduce demand for 
the products being sold.  Accordingly, we would expect firms to reduce production (or, in the 
extreme, to cease operation altogether) and to reduce their demand for labor still further.  To 
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reflect this dynamic, the constant-output elasticity of labor demand must be augmented to 
account for these “scale effects.”   
Hamermesh (1986, 1993) provides the necessary formula: : ′  1   
   where  is 
the price elasticity of demand for the industry’s or firm’s output.   
Since detailed estimates of each industry’s price elasticity of demand are not readily available, 
we rely on two simplifying assumptions.  First, for industries producing chiefly or entirely for 
local consumption, we assume   1.0, which is consistent with households exhibiting Cobb-
Douglas form preferences across industries (that is, when prices change, households adjust their 
spending to keep the share of total income spent on each industry’s output constant).  This also 
assumes that we are analyzing cost shocks that affect all firms in a local industry equally – as we 
are in this case. 
Second, for industries in the tradable goods producing sectors, we must assume a larger value for 
.  These industries face non-local competition, particularly competition from overseas, which 
means that their customers have alternative producers who are likely to be unaffected by the 
labor supply shock we are analyzing.  Thus, the price elasticity of demand for firms in these 
industries is higher.  How much higher is not easy to specify.  In the realm of theory, under 
conditions of perfect competition,   ∞, but this is of debatable relevance to applied analysis.  
As a working hypothesis, we assume that demand in the tradable sectors is ten times as sensitive 
to price changes as in the local market.  That is, we assume   10.0.  The effect of varying 
this assumption is discussed in the Results section, above. 
Labor Supply Elasticity 
The idea of labor supply elasticity is straightforward:  it answers the question, “What is the 
percentage change in labor offered if the wage increases (or decreases) by one percent?”  If the 
change is more than one percent -- for instance, if a 1% increase in the wage leads to a 10% 
increase in labor available – we say that labor supply is “elastic.”  If the change is less than one 
percent – e.g. if a 1% increase in the wage only elicits a 0.5% increase in labor available – we 
say that labor supply is “inelastic.”  The term “elasticity” refers to the ratio between the 
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percentage change in the wage and the percentage change in the labor supply.  In the examples 
above, the labor supply elasticities are 10 and 0.5, respectively.  An elasticity of 1.0 means that 
proportionate changes are equal: a 1% increase in the wage elicits a 1% increase in the quantity 
of labor available. 
Decades of empirical research indicate that male labor supply is quite inelastic and, for employed 
men, may actually be negative (that is, higher wages may induce employed men to work fewer 
hours) (Pencavel 1986, Killingsworth 1983).  The key fact behind this observation is that the vast 
majority of the variation in labor supply relates to the choice to work or not work (e.g. to retire or 
to go to school).  Since labor force participation is near universal among prime-age men, there 
simply isn’t much “room” for variation in male labor supply.  Historically, female labor supply 
has been more elastic: lower labor force participation rates and a greater propensity to work part-
time left more “room” for variation (Killingsworth and Heckman 1986).  But the difference has 
eroded substantially over time.  Blau and Kahn (2007) find that women’s labor supply elasticity 
fell by more than half between 1980 and 2000.   
To arrive at quantitative estimates for male and female labor supply elasticity, we are guided by 
a meta-analysis and synthesis of 209 empirical studies (Michiel Evers, De Mooij and Van 
Vuuren 2008).  For the United States, Evers et al. (2008) use a meta-regression to derive 
estimated elasticities of 0.38 for women and -0.01 for men.  Blau and Kahn (2007) arrive at 
elasticities between 0.357 and 0.413 for married U.S. women.  In his survey of estimates for U.S. 
men, Pencavel (1986) finds results ranging from 0.14 to -0.19, and suggests -0.1 as the best 
“single point” estimate.   
While considerable variation exists in the empirical estimates in the literature (and in the 
methods used to create the estimates), there does seem to be a consensus that both male and 
female labor supply elasticities are well below one, that the elasticity for men is probably near 
zero, and that the elasticity for married women is likely to be somewhere in the vicinity of 0.4.  
(Unmarried women are likely to exhibit labor force behavior similar to men’s.)  For our baseline 
scenario, we adopt a value of (positive) 0.1 for men’s labor supply elasticity and 0.25 for 
women’s (reflecting a weighted average of married and unmarried women’s elasticities).  The 
value adopted for men is somewhat higher than the mid-point of the values found in the literature 
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and may therefore be slightly over-conservative (higher supply elasticities will tend to reduce the 
estimated effects of a supply shock).  However, in practice, our results depend on linear 
combinations of male and female elasticities, and there is so much dispersion in estimates of 
female supply elasticity that a small error in the value for men is likely to be dominated as a 
source of estimation error by the statistical noise associated with the former. 
Supply & Demand System 
To estimate the effect of an adverse labor supply shock, we need to account for the simultaneous 
adjustment of labor demand and labor supply.  We do this in four steps:  First, we specify a 
simplified form of the labor demand and supply functions, and, from these, derive a formula for 
the equilibrium wage.  Second, we calibrate the parameters of these functions to match the 
observed employment and wage levels within each occupation within each industry.   Third, we 
re-calibrate the labor supply function to produce a reduction in supply – at current wages – 
corresponding to the to the policy impact (i.e. 5% of the population of interest employed in each 
occupation in each industry, under our baseline assumptions).  Finally, we calculate the new 
equilibrium wage and employment levels for each industry – occupation combination.   
Our specifications of the labor supply and demand functions are the simplest possible forms 
which exhibit constant elasticities of supply and demand: 
ln ,   ,  ln ,  ,  
ln ,   ,  ln ,   ,  
where ,  is the elasticity of labor supply in industry i and occupation j, , is the wage in 
industry i  for occupation j, and ,  is a constant, which we calibrate for each industry and 
occupation such that the observed wage yields the observed supply of labor.   Similarly ,  is the 
elasticity of labor demand in industry i and occupation j, and ,  is a constant, which we 
calibrate for each industry and occupation such that the observed wage yields the observed 
demand for labor.    
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Strictly speaking, the constant elasticity of demand specification is not consistent with the 
assumption of a constant elasticity of substitution production function.  As discussed above, the 
elasticity of labor demand depends upon both the elasticity of substitution and labor’s share in 
gross output.  However, since the range of impacts we consider here are not large enough to 
significantly alter labor’s share in output, constant elasticity of demand is a reasonable – and 
tractable – local approximation. 
The “equilibrium wage” is the wage at which supply and demand for labor are equal.  We can 
derive an expression for the equilibrium wage from our supply and demand functions by setting 
,  , and solving for ,: 
,  exp,
 
exp, !
"
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We model the labor supply shock due to the implementation of SB 1080 as a reduction in the 
supply-side constant , .  The magnitude of the reduction depends upon the share of 
employment in each industry-occupation group (i, j) and the assumed magnitude of the total 
shock.  We estimate the post-shock equilibrium wage for each such group, using the new value 
of the supply constant, and from the new wage, calculate the new equilibrium demand for labor. 
The change in employment (i.e. total job losses) can be further analyzed into jobs lost due to 
substitution effects (employers using other inputs in place of labor) and jobs lost due to scale 
effects (employers reducing production or going out of business altogether).  Job losses due to 
scale effects correspond to reductions in total output and income in the state – that is, reduction 
in total state GDP.  We estimate the GDP impact by multiplying the relevant job losses by the 
average value added per job in each industry-occupation group. 
We also estimate the (direct) impact on native employment as the difference between total job 
losses (from both scale and substitution effects) and the total number of undocumented workers 
removed from the workforce.   
